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CLASSES, PERSONS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND
VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK V. OLECH
Robert C. Farrell*
Abstract: In most contexts, the Equal Protection Clause serves as a limitation on
government classifications, but it has also been used as a protector of individual rights. These

competing versions of equal protection are contradictory, but courts have for the most part
ignored this problem. In Village of Willowi'brook v. Olech, the United States Supreme Court

determined that an individual homeowner had stated a valid equal protection claim when she
alleged that she alone, without regard to her membership in any class, had been treated
differently from other similarly situated homeowners. The Court's decision in Olech has
created a powerful precedent for other individual persons complaining of wrongful treatment
by government officials. It also suggests a method of resolving the conflict between the two
competing views of equal protection.

In most contexts, the basic role of the Equal Protection Clause is to act
as a limit on government classifications. Tussman and tenBroek formally
articulated this role in their influential article, The Equal Protection of
the Laws.' The United States Supreme Court has provided substantial
support for this view on numerous occasions. Some have gone so far as
to suggest that this limitation on government classification is the only
role of the Equal Protection Clause.2 However, there has always been a
less well-known, less influential version of the Equal Protection Clause
that emphasizes, not classifications, but the protection of individual
persons without regard to their membership in any particular class. This
alternate view of equal protection occupies an uneasy relation with the
more predominant class-based version. The two are apparently
incompatible and might easily come into direct conflict, with one view
emerging as the winner. But this has not happened. Rather, like trains
riding on parallel tracks that never meet, the two apparently incompatible
views of equal protection do not come into direct conflict, but simply
ignore each other. Recently, in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,3 the
*B.A., Trinity College; J.D., Harvard University; Professor, Quinnipiac University School of Law.
I. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341
(1949).
2. The author of this Article was one of those who once made such an assertion. See Robert C.
Farrell, Equal Protection: Overincltsive Classifications and Individual Rights, 41 ARK. L. REV. I

(1988). That position I now recant with this Article.
3. 528 U.S. 562 (2000). For previous commentary on this case, see generally Hortensia S.
Carreira, Protecting the "Class of One," 36 REAL PROP. PROB. TR. J. 331 (2001); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Suing The Government for Arbitrary Actions, 36 TRIAL 89 (May 2000); J. Michael
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Court suggested, although inadvertently,4 how the conflicting versions of
equal protection might be reconciled. Although the Court's opinion in
Olech is extremely brief and makes no mention of the problem, the case
does provide a roadmap for assigning each of the views of equal
protection to its proper sphere. The conceptual result is a greater level of
clarity in the making of equal protection arguments. The practical result
will probably be the proliferation in the federal district courts of cases
where an individual person claims that governmental officials have
treated him or her unequally. 5
This Article will set forth the two variant views of equal protection
and attempt to identify the appropriate context for each. Part I of this
Article sets forth the traditional version of equal protection as a limit on
government classification. Part 1Iintroduces the personal, individualrights view of equal protection. Part III closely examines Olech, which
reinvigorated the individual rights version under the rubric, "class of
one." Part IV examines how Olech has changed litigation in the federal
courts. Finally, Part V takes a second look at the class-based and
individual-rights versions of equal protection in light of Olech.
1.

EQUAL PROTECTION AS A LIMIT ON GOVERNMENT
CLASSIFICATION

A.

Tussman and tenBroek's View of Equal Protection

The notion of equality could not possibly require that all persons be
treated the same. For example, a doctor who prescribed an aspirin to all
his patients would not be treating them equally. 6 And thus, at least since
McGuinness, The Rising Tide of Equal Protection: Willowbrook and the New Non-Arbitrariness
Standard, I I GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J.
263 (2001); J.Michael McGuinness, The Impact of
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech on Disparate Treatment Claims, 17 TOURO L.REV. 595 (2001);
Paul D. Wilson, What Hath Olech Wrought? The Equal Protection Clause in Recent Land-Use
Damages Litigation, 33 URB. LAW. 729 (2001); Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal
Protection Clause and "Classes of One," 89 KY. L. J.69 (2000-2001).
4. The term "inadvertently" is used here because not only did the Court not explicitly claim to be
reconciling a conflict between two different views of the Equal Protection Clause, it did not even
advert to the fact that there was any such conflict. Nor did the Court cite, much less distinguish, any
of the cases that spoke of equal protection as a limit on classifications rather than an individual right.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Olech is discussed at greater length in Part III.B.
5. See infra Part IV.C.
6. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977) (discussing "the right to
treatment as an equal, which is the right, not to receive the same distribution of some burden or
benefit, but to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else. If I have two children,
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Aristotle, it has been understood that equality requires, not that everyone
be treated the same, but that those similarly situated be treated similarly.7
Tussman and tenBroek applied this paradigm to the notion of equality as
it applies to legislation. In opposition to the notion that equality requires
all persons to be treated the same, Tussman and tenBroek explained that
it is not possible to demand that all laws be of a general and universal
character that make no distinction between persons.8 "It is clear that the
demand for equal protection cannot be a demand that laws apply
universally to all persons." 9 Rather, "[f]rom the very necessities of
society, legislation of a special character.., must often be had."' 0 "The
legislature, if it is to act at all, must impose special burdens upon or grant
special benefits to special groups or classes of individuals."' '
But once it is admitted that the legislature is free to enact laws with
less than universal impact, thus treating different groups differently, then
"[w]e... [have] arrive[d] at the point at which the demand for equality
confronts the right to classify."' 2 This is what Tussman and tenBroek
identified as the basic paradox, that "[t]he equal protection of the laws is
a 'pledge of the protection of equal laws.' But laws may classify. And
'the very idea of classification is that of inequality." ' 13 The way out of
this bind turns out to be the doctrine of "reasonable classifications"
where "the reasonableness of a classification 14is the degree of its success
in treating similarly those similarly situated."'
Tussman and tenBroek explained this doctrine as follows. First, the
process of classification involves the "designat[ion of] a ... trait ... the

possession of which, by an individual, determines his membership in or
inclusion within a class."' 5 Thus, for example, the legislature could create
a class by reference to a trait such as gender, age, or citizenship. Once a
class is established, Tussman and tenBroek explained that it must be
and one is dying of a disease that is making the other uncomfortable, I do not show equal concern if
I flip a coin to see who should have the remaining dose of a drug") (emphasis in original).

7. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V.3.1131 a-1131b
I
(W. Ross trans., 1925), quoted in Peter
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543 (1982).
8. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 343 ("A state ... is not compelled to 'run all its laws in
the channels of general legislation."' (citing Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 41 (1907))).
9. Id.
10. Id.
II. Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 343-44.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id.
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tested for reasonableness, that is, its success in treating similarly those
similarly situated.16 But how is the legislature to determine who is
similarly situated? Clearly, this standard requires more than that every
member of the class possess the classifying trait.17 By such a circular
standard, all classifications would be reasonable. Rather, according to
Tussman and tenBroek, in order to test for similarity of situation, "we
must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. A
reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law."' 8
In applying this test, Tussman and tenBroek explained that it is helpful
to think of the class by reference to the trait that makes one a member of
it, and to think of the purpose of the law by reference to the evil or
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. 9 With this terminology, then,
the Tussman and tenBroek test requires us to compare the class that bears
the trait with the class that is tainted by the mischief.20 If a classification
is perfect, the two classes completely coincide. In the real world,
however, classifications are far more likely to be overinclusive,
underinclusive, or both, but courts are quite deferential to legislative
judgments and ordinarily will tolerate a great deal of imprecision. Of the
differing kinds of imprecision, Tussman and tenBroek pointed out that
the more objectionable is the overinclusive classification, the one that
"imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in
the class of those tainted with the mischief at which the law aims."'" The
overinclusive classification "reach[es] out to the innocent bystander, the
hapless victim of circumstance or association,"2 2 and thus is the most
inconsistent with "our traditional antipathy to assertions of mass guilt
and guilt by association, "23
It should be obvious that the Tussman and tenBroek view of equal
protection as a limitation on classification provides no protection for
individuals who are harmed by a classification, so long as the
classification satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. For them, at

16. Id.
17. Id. at 345.
18. Id.
at 346.
19. 1d.
20. Id. at 346-47.

21. Id. at 351.
22. Id.

23. Id. at 352.
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least as applied to legislation, the equal protection clause does not create
individual, personal rights.
B.

The View of Equal Protectionas a Limitation on Classificationsin
the Courts

1.

U.S. Supreme Court Precedent

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly spoken of the Equal
Protection Clause as a limit on government classifications. In Nordlinger
v. Hahn, 4 for example, it explained that "[o]f course, most laws
differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons. The Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps
governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are
in all relevant respects alike."25 This basic explanation led the Court to
specify the traditional deferential rule for evaluating classifications is
that, "the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification
rationally further a legitimate state interest." 6 The NordlingerCourt then
concluded that the different treatment accorded to older and newer
homeowners was rationally related to governmental interests in
neighborhood stability and the protection of reliance interests.27 It was of
no concern to the Court, applying this version of the Equal Protection
Clause, that the plaintiff in the case was paying property taxes five times
higher than her neighbors were paying in similar homes.28 So long as the
classification was reasonable, individual harm or unfairness to a
particular person was not part of the equal protection calculus.
The notion that the Equal Protection Clause's principal work is to
limit government classifications is repeated frequently by the Court.
Another example is Romer v. Evans2 9 where the Court stated that:
The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the
practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose
or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or

24. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 7.

29. 517 U.S. 620(1996).
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persons. We have attempted to reconcile the principle with the
reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold a legislative
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end.3 °
The Court in Romer then ruled that the classification at issue in that
case, one that explicitly singled out gay persons for disadvantageous
treatment, was not one that satisfied the reasonable classification
requirement. 3' The problem was both that the provision at issue
"singl[ed] out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or
general hardships"3 and that it "raise[d] the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected. 3 3 The Court's opinion invalidating the provision
made no reference to individual rights.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia34 is a particularly clear expression of the view that equal
protection is a limit on classification rather than a protector of individual
rights. In that case, the Court reviewed a Massachusetts statute requiring
all state police officers to retire at age fifty.35 The purpose of the law was
to ensure the fitness of officers in order to promote public safety "by
assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police."36 Robert
Murgia, the plaintiff in the case, was more than fifty years of age, but
extremely fit.37 He challenged the law as a denial of equal protection.38 In
effect, Murgia was arguing that he was similarly situated to those under
fifty who were allowed to stay on their jobs and thus he should receive
the same treatment. 39 According to Tussman and tenBroek's analysis, the
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

631 (citations omitted).
632.
633 (emphasis added).
634 (emphasis added).

34. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
35. Id. at 308.
36. Id. at 314.
37. Id. at 311.

38. Id. at 309.
39. On the one hand, the mandatory retirement at age 50 was designed "to remove from police
service those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively has diminished with age." Id. at 315.
On the other hand, Murgia had proved through individualized testing that "his excellent physical and
mental condition rendered him capable of performing the duties of a uniformed officer." Id. at 311.
Thus, it was Murgia's claim that in relation to fitness, he was in fact similar to the presumptively fit
group of those under 50 rather than similar to the presumptively unfit group of those over 50.

Classes or Persons?
issue is whether the class of state troopers over fifty was similarly
situated with the class of state troopers under fifty in relation to the
purpose of ensuring fitness to promote safety.4" Once the Court
determined that fitness tends to decline with age,4 then the classes were
not similarly situated because it is probably true that a greater percentage
of those over fifty were unfit for the rigors of police work than the
percentage of those under fifty who were unfit. Murgia was thus part of a
class that was not similarly situated with the class of those under fifty in
relation to the purpose of the law. Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause
did not require that the members of Murgia's class be treated the same as
those under fifty.
But what about Robert Murgia himself? Murgia had demonstrated
through individual testing that he himself was extremely fit and quite
capable of handling the rigors of police work.42 Wouldn't that entitle him
to the same treatment as other fit individuals? No, it would not. Under
the view of equal protection as a limitation on government classification,
all that was required was that the classification meet the required
standard, without regard to the classification's effect on individual
persons. Once it was determined that the age classification was
reasonably correlated with fitness for police work, and thus that those
who were members of the over fifty group were not similarly situated
with those in the under fifty group, it did not matter what adverse affect
the classification had on an individual member of the class. What was at
work was a classification that made use of a generalization about age that
was reasonably accurate. It did not matter that the generalization was not
true as to a particular member of the class. Thus, the ordinary equal
protection doctrine, at least as applied to legislative or administrative
rules, appears to provide no protection for individuals from being harmed
by classifications that embody generalizations that are not true as to the
individual. In this context, it is very hard to make sense of the claim that
equal protection is a personal, individual right.
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents43 provides further support for the
view that equal protection serves only as a limitation on classifications.
40. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 346 (indicating that "A reasonable classification is one
which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.").
41. Id. at 315.
42. Id. at 311 ("Appellee Murgia had passed ... [a rigorous physical] examination four months
before he was retired, and there is no dispute that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties of a uniformed officer.").
43. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the limits of
Congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through
appropriate legislation." The particular issue was whether Congress had
the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the
prohibitions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA)4 5 to bind state governments. In the course of answering this
question in the negative, 46 the Court used a test that required that there be
"a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end., 4 7 In order to apply this test,
the Court had to compare the kind of age discrimination that would be
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause with the kind of discrimination
that was in fact prohibited by the statute.48 In making this comparison,
the Court made it clear that, unlike the ADEA, the Equal Protection
Clause does not protect individuals. Specifically, the Court stated:
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a
proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are
relevant to the State's legitimate interests. The Constitution does
not preclude reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be
an inaccurateproxy in any individual case is irrelevant. 9
The Kimel Court went on to explain that the constitutionality of age
classifications was not to be determined "on a person by person basis."5
On the other hand, the statutory language of the ADEA specifically made
unlawful "discriminat[ion] against any individual.., because of such
individual's age."'" This statutory language thus created "a presumption
in favor of requiring ... [an] individualized determination."52 Once the
Court had identified this clear distinction between the Equal Protection
Clause (which allows for generalizations that may not be true in
individual cases) and the ADEA (which protects each individual person

44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 111).
46. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67 ("We conclude that the ADEA does contain a clear statement of
Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeded Congress'
authority under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
47. Id. at 81 (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
48. Id. at 82-86 (comparing the conduct prohibited by the statute with the conduct prohibited by
the Equal Protection Clause).
49. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 85-86.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (1994 & Supp. 111).
52. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 87.
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from discrimination), the Court determined that Congress did not have
authority under Section 5 to adopt the ADEA because the conduct
prohibited by the statute was much broader than, and thus not congruent
and proportional to, the conduct prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause.53 The Court's opinion in Kimel is thus very strong evidence that
the Equal Protection Clause does not protect individual rights.
In fact, on at least one occasion, the Supreme Court has suggested that
limiting classifications is the only role of the Equal Protection Clause. In
Oyler v. Boles, 54 the Court reviewed a claim alleging selective
enforcement of a habitual criminal statute. In rejecting that claim, the
Court explained that "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in
enforcement is not itself a federal constitutional violation."55 What was
missing from the allegations in the Oyler case was a claim that "the
selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. 5 6 Without such an
"arbitrary classification," the Court concluded, "grounds supporting a
finding of a denial of equal protection were not alleged."57 The Court's
Oyler opinion is perhaps its strongest statement that equal protection
does no more than limit government classifications.
2.

Lower Federal CourtPrecedent

Some lower federal courts have been even more explicit in the view
that equal protection is a limit on government classifications and nothing
more. One of the strongest versions of this argument was made by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Futernick v. Sumpter
Township.58 In that case, the plaintiff alleged an equal protection
violation when town officials selectively enforced state environmental
regulations against him. 9 In rejecting that claim, the Sixth Circuit, citing
Oyler, found that a claim of selective prosecution must be based on an
53. Id. at 86 ("The Act, through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor,
prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.").
54. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).

55. Id. at 456.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996).
59. Id. at 1056 ("The heart of Futernick's case is the claim that state officials ... violated his
constitutional right to equal protection of the law by selectively enforcing Michigan state
environmental regulations.").
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unjustifiable standard on the grounds of "race, religion, or other arbitrary6
classification."6 The court explained that an "arbitrary classification" '
implied that "group distinctions could be a basis for liability ' 62 but that
not every act of arbitrariness directed at an individual would be
constitutionally impermissible.63 The court determined that Futemick's
equal protection claim failed because he did "not claim to be a member
of any group ' ' 64 but had simply alleged town officials had acted in bad
faith toward him individually. 65At least with regard to equal protection
claims of selective enforcement, the Sixth Circuit in Futernick read
Supreme Court precedent as requiring "arbitrary classifications" 66 as a
basis of liability. According to the Sixth Circuit, "choosing to67 enforce the
law against a particular individual is [not] a 'classification.'
Futernick further explained that limiting equal protection claims to
allegations of arbitrary classifications, that is, decisions aimed at a
particular group, was essential in order to limit the work of the federal
courts and to give proper deference to the judgment of local officials.68
For example, the Sixth Circuit explained, a court could require that equal
protection claims of bad faith toward an individual be accompanied by
the requirement of also showing that "others who are similarly situated in
'all relevant aspects' have not been regulated." 69 The focus on "similarly
situated"7 persons would act as a screening device, in that not every act
of bad faith directed at an individual would be an equal protection
violation. Rather, equal protection would only prohibit those acts of bad
faith where one individual had been singled out while other similarly
situated individuals were left unregulated. Such a rule would protect
individuals without requiring them to identify any class-based
discrimination.
60. Id. at 1057 (citing Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1057 n.8.
64. Id. at 1057.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1058.
68. Id. ("Furthermore, we see compelling reasons that the sundry motivations of local regulators
should not be policed by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, absent the
intent to harm a protected group or punish the exercise of a fundamental right. The sheer number of
possible cases is discouraging.") (emphasis in original).
69. Id. (citing Rubinowitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995)).
70. Id.

Classes or Persons?
But, according to the Futernick court, such a rule would also make it
too easy for litigious plaintiffs to get past the motion to dismiss stage and
advance to summary judgments because:
Determining 'all relevant aspects' of similar situations usually
depends on too many facts (and too much discovery) to allow
dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If we require defendants to
wait until summary judgment, we burden local and state officials
with the regular prospect of 'fishing expeditions' and meritless
suits. In the meantime we federalize and constitutionalize what are
essentially issues of local law and policy.7'
The Sixth Circuit was concerned about the possibility of expanding equal
protection to simple claims of arbitrariness or animosity not related to
group identity.7 2 The state needed to retain the discretion to determine
against whom to enforce its laws, especially because the state has never
been in a position to enforce all laws at all times against all infractions. It
is both appropriate and necessary "for a state somehow to choose to
prosecute or regulate only part of the group of people who may be
violating the law, and to do so without subjecting the selection decision
to micro-management by courts."73 The requirement that allegations of
arbitrariness or animosity by governmental officials must include a
reference to group identity would exclude most of these claims.74 Thus,
according to Futernick, the Equal Protection Clause is only relevant
when a plaintiff has alleged an arbitrary or invidious classification. A
mere claim of arbitrary or invidious conduct toward an individual person
will not suffice.
Powell v. Montgomery75 is another recent case where a federal district
court made an extremely strong statement supporting the class-based
version of equal protection. In that case, the plaintiff had been fired from
his job with the fire department for failing to obey an order to have
himself weighed to determine his compliance with the department's

71. Id. at 1058-59 (internal citations omitted).
72. Id. at 1059.
73. Id. at 1060.
74. Id. at 1058-59 (indicating that, without a requirement that an equal protection claimant
include an allegation of an intent to harm a protected group or punish the exercise of a fundamental
right, "[t]he sheer number of possible cases is discouraging," and suggesting that the requirement of
alleging an invidious classification is part of a view that "counsels against expanding a federal right
to protection from non-group animosity on the part of local officials").
75. 56 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
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weight management regulations.76 In response to his equal protection
claim that the regulations had been applied unequally to him, the court
insisted that his equal protection claim had to include an allegation of
purposeful discrimination.77 In explaining how one proved purposeful
discrimination, a federal district court for the Middle District of Alabama
cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney.78 There the Court stated that discriminatory
purpose "implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group., 79 The federal
district court in Powell interpreted this language to mean that the
plaintiffs equal protection claim needed to include an allegation that the
defendant's conduct had been "deliberately based on an unjustifiable,
8 ° Because the plaintiff
group-based standard."
in Powell had only
alleged unequal treatment toward himself as an individual, his claim was
rejected."
Judge J. Skelly Wright, while he was Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, also shared the view of
equal protection as being no more than a limit on government
classification. In the course of an argument against the notion that equal
protection violations required proof of purposeful discrimination, he
included the following:
The key here is that the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause is primarily
concerned with classes or groups, not individuals. As I am
confident Mr. Justice Frankfurter must have written somewhere, a
case invoking the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause, if it is to succeed,
must allege something more than a tort, personal to the plaintiff.82
All of the cases cited in this section constitute strong support for the
view that equal protection operates to limit government classifications,
but does no more than that. However, as the next section will

76. Id. at 1331.
77. Id. at 1332.
78. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).

79. Id. at 279.
80. Powell, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1333 (quoting E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1114
(I Ith Cir. 1987)) (emphasis in Powell).
81. Id.
82. J. Skelly Wright, Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. CR-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1980).
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demonstrate, there is an alternate view of equal protection that will
necessarily call that wisdom into question.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION AS A PROTECTOR OF INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS

The alternate view of equal protection focuses, not on limiting
governmental classifications, but on protecting individual rights. This
view of equal protection has an obvious contextual basis; the Fourteenth
Amendment itself provides that no state shall deny to any person the
equal protection of the laws.13 Shelley v. Kramer84 was one of the earliest
cases expressing this version of equal protection. In that case, the
defendants had argued that the state courts were not treating black
residents unequally in enforcing a racially restrictive covenant because
the courts would be equally willing to enforce such a covenant against
white persons.15 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this "equal
discrimination" argument as amounting to no more than the
"indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."86 The Court explained that,
even if courts were willing to penalize all races equally, that would not
satisfy the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause because "[t]he rights
created by ...the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to
the individual. The rights established are personal rights."87 Thus, an
individual black person who is unable to buy a home because of his race
has been treated unequally, without regard to a court's willingness to
prevent a white person from buying a home because of his race.
Although the Court in Shelley rejected the "equal application" defense
on the basis of a personal rights view of equal protection, it is quite clear
that there was no need to resort to that explanation in order to reach that
result. In Loving v. Virginia,88 the Court considered and rejected, without
any reference to personal rights, a similar argument that had been made
in defense of a statute that prohibited interracial marriage.89 In Loving,
the statute was defended on the ground that the state was willing to

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id.at21.
Id.at 22.
Id.
388 U.S. 1(1967).
Id.at 8.
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prohibit interracial marriage equally by both black and white persons.90
The Court rejected that argument on the grounds that the statutes
contained "racial classifications," and "the fact of equal application does
not immunize the statutes from the very heavy burden of justification
which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state
statutes drawn according to race."'" Thus, the problem the Court
identified in Loving, and which it ought to have identified in Shelley, was
an indefensible classification, not an invasion of a personal right.
However, notwithstanding Loving, the view of equal protection as an
individual right has had several more recent expressions in a series of
affirmative action cases, where it has generally been used by those
opposed to affirmative action, or at least by those opposed to a lesser
standard of review for affirmative action. In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 92 Justice Powell argued that all racial classifications,
whether invidious or benign, should be subjected to strict scrutiny.93 In
support of this conclusion, Justice Powell cited the personal nature of the
equal protection guarantee.94 He began by citing the above-quoted
language in Shelley that the rights established by the equal protection
clause are personal rights.95 He then insisted that "[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are
not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal. 96 Justice Powell
criticized the "artificial line of a 'two-class theory' of the Fourteenth
Amendment," 97 and insisted that "[n]othing in the Constitution supports
the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise
impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their
ethnic groups." 98 Justice Powell's concluding words on the subject were
a strong endorsement of the individual rights position. He said, "[i]f it is
the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications
based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
90. Id.
91. Id.
at 9.
92. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
93. Id. at 291.
94. Idat 289-90.
95. Id.at 289 (quoting Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 22 (1948)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 295. The "two-class theory" to which Powell here refers is the view that the Equal
Protection Clause is directed solely at discrimination "based on differences between 'white' and
Negro." Id. at 295 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954)).
98. Id.at 298.
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impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of
his membership in a particular group, then constitutional standards may
be applied consistently ....The Constitution guarantees that right to
every person regardless of his background." 99
Subsequently, in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,'00 the Supreme
Court articulated an extremely strong version of the individual rights
view of equal protection. In Adarand, the Court, for the first time in a
majority opinion, held that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of
review for all racial classifications, without regard to the level of
government that was making the classification.01° In so holding, the
Court cited Justice Powell's Bakke opinion at some length as strong
support for the individual rights view of equal protection." 2 Going
beyond that, the Court in Adarand argued that its previous cases had
established three general propositions with regard to racial
classifications: skepticism, consistency, and congruence. 3 According to
the Court, these three propositions:
All derive from the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution protect persons not groups. It
follows from that principle that all governmental action based on
race-a group classification long recognized as 'in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,'-should be
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal
04
right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.1
The Court explained further that "whenever the government treats any
person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an
injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection."'' 0 5 The majority criticized
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, which had argued that it was
appropriate to review benign racial classifications more generously than

99. Id. at 299.
100. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).

101. Id. at 224 ("Taken together, these three propositions lead to the conclusion that any person,
of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial
scrutiny.").
102. Id. at 224-25.

103. Id. at 223-24.
104. Id. at 227 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)) (emphasis in
original).
105. Id.
at 229-30 (emphasis added).
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invidious racial classifications, 116 as inconsistent "with the
long line of
07
cases understanding equal protection as a personal right."'
Outside of the affirmative action context, the Court has also used
personal rights rhetoric to explain why gender classifications should be
08
subjected to a heightened level of scrutiny. In Frontierov. Richardson,1
the plurality opinion explained that sex, "like race and national origin, is
an immutable characteristic determined solely by accident of birth"' 9
and thus to impose disabilities on the basis of sex "would seem to violate
'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility."'' Further, because "the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society,"' ' ' classifications based on sex "often have the
effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior
legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members." 2 These statements seem to suggest that what is objectionable
about gender classifications is that they fail to take into account
individual differences within the sexes, that is, they involve broad
generalizations that are not universally true, and thus, wrongfully ignore
individual merit. Thus, equal protection would appear to protect
individual rights.
However, the Supreme Court's assertions of the essentially personal
nature of the right to equal protection are striking in their inconsistency
with the host of Supreme Court cases identifying equal protection as a
limit on governmental classifications" 3 and in their willingness to ignore
those cases. For example, consider Justice Powell's personal rights
language in Bakke as it might apply to the facts of Murgia." 4 In Murgia,
the issue was precisely the Court's unwillingness to look at Robert
Murgia's personal situation, that is, his own proven qualifications for
police work.'" The Court apparently was uninterested in the argument
that "it is the individual who is entitled to equal protection against
106. See id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

107. Id. at 230.
108. 411 U. S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 686.
110. Id. (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) (emphasis added).
111. Id.

112. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
113. See supra Part 1.B.

114. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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classifications based on [age] because such distinctions impinge on
personal rights."'"1 6 Rather, what was important for the Court in Murgia
was the reasonableness of the age classification which had the effect of
terminating Murgia's employment. The Court apparently viewed Murgia
as someone who was to be considered "only because of his membership
in a particular group."' 7 Or, if Adarand is to be used as precedent, why
was it not true of Murgia that "whenever the government treats any
person unequally because of his or her [age], that person has suffered an
injury [under the Equal Protection Clause]"?" 8 While it is true that race
classifications are more suspicious than age classifications and thus
should be more strictly scrutinized, the Court has given no reasonable
explanation for treating equal protection as a personal right in the
affirmative action cases, but not in most other areas of equal protection.
In fact, it appears that the two views of equal protection are quite
inconsistent and thus can survive together only so long as they continue
to ignore each other. However, in Olech, the Supreme Court, apparently
inadvertently and implicitly, identified a way in which the two versions
of equal protection can be reconciled.
IlI.

VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK V.OLECH

A.

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech in the Lower Courts

1.

The DistrictCourt Rejects Mrs. Olech's Individual Rights Claim

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech" 9 did not begin as a case likely to
lead to a significant precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court. Rather, it
began rather trivially, when Grace Olech's well broke and could not be
repaired. 2 ° Fortunately for Mrs. Olech, the public water supply was close
at hand and the Village of Willowbrook was willing to connect her to
it.'' Unfortunately, the Village demanded from Mrs. Olech, as part of

116. This was the language Justice Powell used in his Bakke opinion, although with regard to race
classifications rather than age classifications. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265,299 (1978).
117. Id.
118. This was the language the Court used in Adarand ConstructorsInc. v.Payna, 515 U.S. 200,
229-30 (1995), although, once again, with regard to race rather than age.
119. 1998 WL 196455 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 13, 1998).
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id.
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the connection process, a 33-foot easement "while only requiring a 15foot easement from other Village residents."' 122 Mrs. Olech complained,
but the Village initially would not reduce the size of the required
easement. 23 This dispute between Mrs. Olech and the Village was the
classic "garden variety" land use dispute that rarely gets to federal court
and, if it does, is likely to be dismissed very quickly at the early stages.
Mrs. Olech's case did get to federal district court, but was dismissed for
24
failure to state a claim.
According to Mrs. Olech's allegations before a district court in the
Northern District of Illinois, the Village had initially demanded more of
her than of others because village officials still harbored "substantial ill
will" against her because she had successfully sued the Village in
another matter six years earlier.' 25 During the delay caused by this
dispute, Mrs. Olech was without running water for three months and it
was "this three-month delay that Olech claim[ed] deprived her of her
rights under the Equal Protection Clause.' ' 126 A federal district court for
the Northern District of Illinois had no difficulty in disposing of Mrs.
Olech's action. The court cited Esmail v. Macrane,127 an earlier case
from the Seventh Circuit that the Olech district court read as requiring an
"orchestrated campaign[] of official harassment directed against [a
plaintiff] out of sheer malice" in order for a plaintiff to prevail. 28 The
court concluded that Mrs. Olech's complaint did not describe the
"malignant animosity"' 129 or the "orchestrated campaign of official
harassment" required by Esmail.3 ° Her assertions of vindictiveness and
retaliation were mere "conclusory assertions" that did not include factual
underpinnings sufficient to support them. 131

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3-4.
See id. at *2.
Id.
53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
Olech, 1998 WL 196455, at *3 (citing Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2.

The Seventh CircuitReverses on the Basis ofJudge Posner's
Vindictive Action Theory of Equal Protection

Mrs. Olech appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and Chief Judge Posner wrote the opinion for that court. 32 It
turns out that, at least from Mrs. Olech's perspective, Judge Posner was
exactly the right person to consider her claim.
a.

Earlier "Class of One" Claims in the Seventh Circuit

For several years before Olech, Judge Posner had been arguing in
favor of a particular view of equal protection that was not shared by all
the judges of the Seventh Circuit. 33 The particular issue was the nature
of the "class of one" claim by an individual against the government.
While it had been clear since Ciechon v. City of Chicago'34 that "class of
one" equal protection claims were recognized in the Seventh Circuit, the
conceptual underpinning of these claims was not at all clear. In Ciechon,
the Seventh Circuit upheld the equal protection claim of a paramedic
who had been discharged for the allegedly inadequate treatment of a
patient, while the paramedic who had been working with her and had
been equally responsible for the patient was not punished. 35 The court
explained that "[e]qual protection demands at a minimum that a
municipality must apply its laws in a rational and nonarbitrary way.' 36
The effect of this rule was to "protect[] against intentional invidious
discrimination by the state against persons similarly situated."' 37
The Ciechon decision appeared to require a successful claimant to
prove, as Ciechon herself had done, that she had been treated differently
from a similarly situated person. In addition, a claimant would have to
prove that this different treatment was "intentional" as opposed to being
the result of "error or mistake in the application of the law."' 3' Beyond
132. Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998).
133. This view of equal protection that differed from Judge Posner's is set forth infra notes 14054 and accompanying text.
134. 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 353 (7th Cir.
1998) ("So called 'class of one' equal protection claims, cases 'in which the governmental body
treated individuals differently who were identically situated in all respects rationally related to the
government's mission' have been allowed in this circuit since at least Ciechon.") (citation omitted).
135. Ciechon, 686 F.2d at 516-17.
136. Id. at 522.
137. Id. at 522-23.
138. See id.
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this, the Ciechon court made no mention of any requirement of
vindictiveness or ill will, unless one could read such a requirement into a
phrase the court did use, "intentional invidious discrimination."'' 9 But
several post-Ciechon cases from the Seventh Circuit specifically held,
not only that proof of animosity was not necessary to make out an equal
protection violation, but also that it was not sufficient. For example, in
Falls v. Town of Dyer, 40 Judge Easterbrook upheld the equal protection
claim of a convenience store owner who had alleged that he was "the
only person against whom the town enforce[d] [its] portable sign
ordinance."' 4 ' According to Judge Easterbrook, if the plaintiff could
show a pattern of selectivity under which everyone else was allowed to
use portable signs but the plaintiff was not, that would make out a valid
claim.1 2 On the other hand, according to Judge Easterbrook, even if the
plaintiff could prove "that someone in local government had a vendetta
against [plaintiff] but that the law is being enforced rationally against
others,"' 3 he would not survive a motion for summary judgment. Thus,
for Judge Easterbrook, the essence of a "class of one" claim was the
different treatment of a single individual compared with everyone else,
without regard to the motivation behind that treatment.
A subsequent opinion by the Seventh Circuit made it even clearer that
a vindictive motivation by a government official did not make out an
equal protection claim. In Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 44 the
Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs "class of one" claim arising out of
allegations that the city had singled out the plaintiff arbitrarily and made
his employment at a city marina virtually impossible. 5 According to the
court, the plaintiffs allegation that he was singled out by the local
officials out of animosity did not make out a valid equal protection
claim. 46 For purposes of a motion to dismiss, even if the allegation that

139. Id.
140. 875 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1989).
141. Id. at 147 (emphasis in original).
142. See id. at 149.
143. Id.
144. 965 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1992).
145. Id. at453.
146. See id. at 459 ("He simply alleges that he, and he alone, was singled out by the City Parents
out of animosity and for no good reason. His equal protection claim would fail under the principle
stated in New Burnhamn Prairie Homes." (New Burnham Prairie Homes Inc. v. Vill. of Burnham,
910 F.2d 1474 7th Cir. (1990))). The court in Wroblewski had earlier cited New Burnham for the
proposition that "an equal protection claim requires discrimination because of membership in a
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the city acted out of animosity were assumed to be true, it would still be
"insufficient to defeat the City policy's presumed rationality.1 4 7
"[A]nimosity is not necessarily inconsistent with a rational basis."'' 48 It
might be rational for the city to conclude that the animosity it felt toward
the plaintiff, even if not the fault of the plaintiff, would be "likely to
doom any future association to failure."'4 Thus, for the Seventh Circuit
in Wroblewski, the essence of an equal protection claim had nothing to
do with subjective ill will; rather, it required an allegation of different
treatment of similarly situated persons.' 50 Since the plaintiff in
Wroblewski had failed to identify anyone similarly situated to himself
who had been treated differently, he did not make out a successful equal
protection claim.
Another Seventh Circuit panel also rejected a vindictive action equal
protection claim. In Herro v. City of Milwaukee,'5' the plaintiff had
alleged that the city had denied him a tavern license because of the city's
animosity toward him.'52 The court found the claim wanting, at least in
part because "claims of state action motivated by personal vendettas 'are
hardly the type of allegations necessary to sustain an equal protection
claim."" 53 The Seventh Circuit in Herro cited with approval a case that
had dismissed an equal protection claim when it had been based only "on
allegations that [a] state official engaged in vendetta to destroy
plaintiff."' 54
b.

Judge Posner's Vindictive Action Theory

These four cases served as background for Judge Posner when he
entered the arena in 1995 to write the opinion for the Seventh Circuit in
Esmail v. Macrane'55 Judge Posner upheld an equal protection claim by
a liquor store owner whose license was not renewed because of a "deepclass." Id.at 965 F. 2d. at 458-59 (citing New Burnham, 910 F.2d at 1481-82) (emphasis in
Wroblewski only).
147. Id. at 460.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 459.
151. 44 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 1995).
152. Id. at 552.
153. See id. at 552-53 (citing Universal Sec. Ins. Co. v. Koefoed, 775 F. Supp. 240, 247 (N.D. Ill.
1991)).
154. Id.
155. 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:367, 2003

seated animosity"' 5 6 toward him by city officials. Judge Posner conceded
that "[t]his is an unusual kind of equal protection case"1"7 because it
involved neither a charge of singling out members of a vulnerable group
nor a challenge to a law alleged to make irrational distinctions.'58 Rather,
the claim involved only a charge "that a powerful public official picked
on a person out of sheer vindictiveness."' 59 Although the case bore
similarities to those of "selective prosecution,"' 160 Judge Posner pointed
out that selective enforcement of the law is not an equal protection
problem unless "the decision to prosecute is made either in retaliation for
the exercise of a constitutional right ... or because of membership in a
vulnerable group.' 6 ' Esmail's claim did not meet any of these criteria,
but Judge Posner found that he had made out a claim nonetheless.
According to Judge Posner, "equal protection does not just mean
treating identically situated persons identically.' ' 61 Judge Posner cited
Ciechon to support the rule that conduct motivated by vindictiveness
toward a particular individual violates the equal protection clause. 63 This
was the correct view, according to Judge Posner, because "[i]f the power
of the government is brought to bear on a harmless individual merely
because a powerful state or local official harbors a malignant animosity
164
toward him, the individual ought to have a remedy in federal court.',
Although the unfair treatment was directed at an individual rather than a
group, this fact was not determinative because "neither in terms nor in
interpretation is the [equal protection] clause limited to protecting
members of identifiable groups."' 165 Thus, Esmail had satisfied his burden
by alleging that "the action taken by the state ... was a spiteful effort to

'get'

him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state

objective."

'

66

156. Id. at 178.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 178-79 (explaining the two meanings of the term "selective prosecution" but
concluding that the plaintiff's claim in Esinail was "not pleaded as a case of selective prosecution in
any of the above senses").
161. Id. at 179.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 180.
166. Id.
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c.

Reconciling Vindictive Action Claims with ComparativeRight
Claims

However, even if one agrees with Judge Posner that vindictivelymotivated conduct directed at an individual by a government official
"ought to have a remedy in federal court,"' 67 it is not immediately
obvious why the source of this remedy ought to be the Equal Protection
Clause. Although Judge Posner had conceded that "[t]his is an unusual
kind of equal protection case,' 'j 68 he understated how unusual it was,
because there is ordinarily widespread agreement that equal protection
arguments, whether they involve classifications or not, are inherently
comparative.'6 9 A claimant insists that he or she has a right to a certain
treatment because someone else, allegedly similarly situated, is getting
that same treatment. Judge Posner's vindictive action claims involve no
comparison, but rather simply a claim that the government has treated
one person badly because of subjective ill will. 7 °
However, there are two ways in which the vindictive action claim
might be reconciled with the traditional notion of equal protection as a
comparative right. The first is to argue that a vindictive action claim
assumes an implied comparison with a class or person, that is, there is an
implied comparison with the group or person whom the government has
By means of this implied
treated rationally, without any ill will.'
comparison to this implied group, one could argue that a vindictive
action claim is in fact a comparative claim. However, the rather large
amount of implication that this defense requires makes it not particularly
compelling.

167. Id. at 179.
168. Id. at 178.
169. See, e.g., Buckles v. Columbus Mun. Airport Auth., 2002 WL 193853, at *13 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 14, 2002) ("Nevertheless, even a class of one must show that he or she was treated differently
than similarly situated individuals. An equal protection claim simply cannot exist absent an
allegation that, compared to others, the plaintiff was treated less favorably.") (emphasis in original).
170. E.g., Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180 (indicating that, to establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, a claimant must prove that "the action taken by the state ... was a spiteful effort to 'get' him
for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective").
171. See, e.g., Kiser v. Naperville Cmty. Unit, 227 F. Supp. 2d 954, 972 (N.D. 111.2002) ("[T]he
District argues that [the plaintiff, a lawyer] cannot state an equal protection claim because he did not
allege that other lawyers were employed by the District. The potential relevance of other lawyers is
obvious from the complaint, so the District can reasonably foresee a subsequent allegation that such
lawyers existed. For this reason, the omission of a specific allegation of fact concerning other
lawyers in the complaint does not mandate dismissal.").
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An alternative justification has some support from Tussman and
tenBroek and the U.S. Supreme Court. As Tussman and tenBroek
pointed out, one cannot tell who is similarly situated to whom without
reference to the purpose of a law, and any useful consideration of
purposes must close off certain purposes as impermissible, so that the
constitutional standard requires a classification to be rationally related to
a permissible purpose.17 1 It is not a large step from here to conclude that
government action designed to achieve an impermissible purpose
violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has taken this
very step in two cases where it analyzed a neutral rule that was
improperly applied because of an inappropriate motivation.
In the first of these cases, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,'73 decided more than
one hundred years before Olech, the Court found a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause in the manner in which the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors applied an ordinance, neutral on its face, that required a
person operating a laundry to obtain the consent of the Board unless the
laundry was located in a building made of brick or stone. 174 The Board
had rejected the applications of all Chinese applicants but had consented
to all others.' 75 As the Court explained, the problem did not involve a
general rule "for the regulation of the use of property for laundry
purposes, to which all similarly situated may conform."' 1 76 No one would
have a constitutional problem with a general rule about wooden or brick
buildings for laundries. But the problem in Yick Wo was not the rule
itself, but rather its application. Although the law itself was impartial on
its face, it was applied "with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to
amount to a practical denial by the state of ...equal protection."' 7 7 The
law was "applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
' 78
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances." 1
Although the oppressive application of the laundry rule in Yick Wo
was directed at a class of Chinese persons rather than one individual

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra notes 15-18, 25-26 and accompanying text.
118U.S. 356(1886).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 373-74.
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person,'79 the case made clear that the Equal Protection Clause was broad
enough to prohibit not only facially invalid classifications appearing in
statutes, but also the oppressive application of impartial rules to
individual persons. The determining factor was the presence of the evil
eye, the unequal hand, or the oppressive mind. 180 These factors seem to
cover much of the same territory as Judge Posner's "subjective ill will"
theory.
Additionally, there is a much more recent precedential case on point.
In 1985, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,Inc.,' the Court
found an equal protection violation in the city's refusal to grant a special
use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded.' 82 The Court
found it unnecessary to decide whether the regulation requiring a special
use permit for "hospitals for the insane or feebleminded"' 83 was facially
invalid since the Court found it easier to conclude that the regulation was
unconstitutional as applied. 8 4 The Court sifted through the city's
purported justifications for denying the permit and found them all either
impermissible or not credible.' 85 It then concluded that the denial of the
special use permit to this particular home was unconstitutional because it
could be explained only by "an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded, including those who would occupy the [group home].' 86 This
"as applied" version of equal protection that looks to the motivation
behind the administrative application of a local regulation also appears to

179. Id. at 359 (indicating that 150 natives of China had been arrested for operating a laundry

without the required consent while 80 persons not subjects of China were allowed to operate their
laundries without the required consent, and that these numbers demonstrate "a system of oppression
of one kind of men and favoritism to all others").
180. Id. at 373-74 (referring to "a mind so unequal and oppressive" and "an evil eye and an
unequal hand").
181. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
182. Id. at435.
183. Id. at 436.
184. Id. at 447 ("We inquire first whether requiring a special use permit for the Featherstone
home in the circumstances here deprives respondents of the equal protection of the laws. If it does,

there will be no occasion to decide whether the special use permit provision is facially invalid where
the mentally retarded are involved, or to put it another way, whether the city may never insist on a
special use permit for a home for the mentally retarded in an R-3 zone. This is the preferred course
of adjudication since it enables courts to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional
judgments."). Having determined that it was preferable to decide the constitutionality of the
ordinance on an as applied basis, the Court then found it unconstitutional on that basis. Id. at 450.

185. Id. at 448-50.
186. Id. at 450.
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be very similar to Judge Posner's "subjective ill will."' 87 It is also quite
clearly a precedent for the conclusion that the protection of the Equal
Protection Clause extends to individuals harmed by administrative
decisions, without the necessity of showing that the harm results from an
improper classification. In any case, Judge Posner's view of the equal
protection clause as prohibiting government action that is motivated by
ill will, while not in the mainstream of equal protection arguments, does
have some support from the U.S. Supreme Court.
It was with this background that Judge Posner wrote the opinion for
the Seventh Circuit in Olech. For Judge Posner, his previous opinion in
Esmail was dispositive. Judge Posner in Esmail had found a
constitutional violation when there was proof of "a spiteful effort to 'get'
[a person] for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state
objective."' 88 Judge Posner found that Olech's complaint satisfied this
standard in that it alleged that her previous lawsuit against the Village
had generated "substantial ill will" and that, as a result, she had been
treated differently from other property owners in the village in terms of
the size of the easement demanded. 8 9 Judge Posner noted that the
District Court had read too much into Esmail's reference to an
"orchestrated campaign of official harassment,"' 90 since, according to
Judge Posner, a showing of subjective ill will does not require evidence
of a "general" orchestration.' 9' Judge Posner concluded that he was
troubled "by the prospect of turning every squabble over municipal
services, of which there must be tens or even hundreds of thousands
every year, into a federal constitutional case,"' 92 but he was confident
that the requirement of proving "totally illegitimate animus" toward the
plaintiff would be a substantial check on the likely success of any such
claim. 193

187. Cf Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (indicating that an Equal Protection
Clause claimant must prove that "the action taken by the state ... was a spiteful effort to 'get' him
for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective").
188. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Esmail v. Macrane,
53 F. 3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)).
189. Id. at 387-88.
190. Id. at 388 (citing Esmail, 53 F.3d at 179).
191.

Id. at 388.

192. Id.
193. Id.
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B.

The U.S. Supreme Court Endorses Mrs. Olech 's Individual Equal
Protection Claim

It may have been expected that the decision of the Seventh Circuit
would end this "garden variety" land-use dispute, but the Village sought
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, and, surprisingly, the Court decided
to hear the case.' 94 Also surprising had to be the Supreme Court opinion
that followed,'95 particularly its brevity and the casualness with which the
Court treated the problem before it. The entire per curiam opinion
consisted of five paragraphs. 9 6 The first three paragraphs summarized
the facts and procedural history below, and then concluded with the
Court's identification of the issue as "whether the Equal Protection
Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a 'class of one' where
the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group."' 97 The
Court's entire substantive response to this question consisted of exactly
two short paragraphs.
In the first of these paragraphs, the Court stated that "[o]ur cases have
recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of
one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment."' 99 This statement of the "class of one"
problem was obviously different from the manner in which Judge Posner
had posed it below. Judge Posner had been concerned with the allegation
that the Village had vindictively singled out Mrs. Olech in retaliation for
a previous lawsuit."' Judge Posner's theory requires a plaintiff to
produce evidence of the defendant officials' subjective motivation, but
not necessarily evidence of similarly situated persons who were treated
differently. The Supreme Court's explanation, on the other hand, requires
a plaintiff to produce evidence that similarly situated persons were
treated differently, but not any evidence of the defendant's subjective
motivation for the conduct being challenged."' The Supreme Court

194. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 527 U.S. 1067 (1999) (mem.).
195. Vii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
196. Id. at 563-65.
197. Id. at 564.
198. Id.
199. Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998).
200. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 (recognizing an equal protection claim where a plaintiff alleges
different treatment from others similarly situated); id. at 565 (indicating that the Court's decision
was not based on the theory of "subjective ill will").
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explicitly distanced itself from the "subjective ill will" theory that had
been relied on by Judge Posner below.20 '
1. The U.S. Supreme Court'sSurprising Citations in Support of its
Holding
The U.S. Supreme Court cited two cases in support of its "class of
one" holding: Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,20 2 a largely
ignored case from 1923, and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission of Webster County,2"3 a more recent case that the Court had
previously attempted to limit to its facts. These two supporting cases
were as far removed from the pantheon of influential equal protection
cases as one could imagine. 2 4 However, both of these supporting cases
involved successful attempts by individual plaintiffs who challenged
excessive property tax appraisals on real property when other similar
properties had been appraised at comparatively lower rates.
In Sioux City Bridge, the Court ruled that a bridge company had
proven a violation of the Equal Protection Clause when it demonstrated
that its property was assessed at one hundred percent of its valuation
while other properties were assessed at fifty-five percent of their
valuations.20 5 The Court then explained that "the purpose of the [E]qual
[P]rotection [C]lause... is to secure every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents. ' 20 6 The Court emphasized that it was

201. Id. at 565.
202. 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
203. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
204. In the fifty years before Olech, the Supreme Court had cited Sioux City Bridge in the text of
a majority opinion only one time. That single citation was in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, the case
that the Court had later limited to its facts. In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), the petitioners
argued that the result in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal required invalidation of a very similar property
tax assessment scheme in their case. The Nordlinger Court rejected the argument, purporting to find
"an obvious and critical factual difference," id.
at 14, and concluding that Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
"was the rare case where the facts precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the unequal
assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme." Id. at 16. See
also Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 404-05 (1999) (arguing that "[tihe effect of
Nordlinger... is to limit Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal to its very narrow set of facts").

205. Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 445.
206. Id. (citing Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Tpk., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)).
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"intentional systematic undervaluation""2 7 that would violate the Equal
Protection Clause, not "mere errors of judgment."2 °8 The assessment in
Sioux City Bridge was viewed, not as an example of arbitrary
discrimination by the legislature in the enactment of a statute, but rather
of intentional discrimination by a local board, the "duly constituted
agents," in setting the tax value for one particular piece of property.20 9
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal involved a coal company that complained
about an acquisition value assessment scheme that had the effect of
appraising its property, based on its recent purchase price, at a level that
was thirty-five times the level applied to owners of comparable property
who had purchased their property at earlier times.2"' In concluding a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court once again
emphasized "intentional systematic undervaluation" of comparable
property and concluded that "[t]he equal protection clause... protects
the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory
treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same
class."2 ' Although no property owner had an independent right to have
his or her individual property assessed at less than its fair market value,
the Equal Protection Clause conferred on each property owner a
comparative right to have his or property assessed at the same standard
as other owners, even if that standard resulted in a valuation substantially
below market value.212
Although Sioux City Bridge and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, broadly
interpreted, provide some support for the Court's holding in Olech, they
do not do so with much force. They were, of course, tax cases, not land
use cases as Olech was. Although both cases involved a single,
individual plaintiff, a "class of one" whose equal protection claim
succeeded, neither of the decisions explicitly alluded to that fact. Nor had
the Supreme Court, before Olech, ever cited them as "class of one"
cases. And it certainly strains credulity to claim, as the Court did, that the
207. Id.
208. Id. at 447.
209. Id. at 445.
210. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. County Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 341
(1989).
211. Id. at 345-46 (citing Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946)).
212. Id. at 346 (indicating that "the fairness of one's allocable share of the total property tax
burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by comparisonwith the share of others similarly situated
relative to their property holdings" and concluding that "relative undervaluation" of comparable
property... over time therefore denies petitioners the equal protection of the law") (emphases
added).
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"class of one" equal protection claim had been "recognized" since these
two cases had been decided.
But in any case, having determined that these two cases provided
adequate support for its holding, the Olech Court found that Mrs. Olech's
complaint stated a valid claim. Her complaint was sufficient because she
had alleged "that the Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement
as a condition of connecting her property to the municipal water supply
where the Village required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly
situated property owners, 21 3 and that this demand was "irrational and
wholly arbitrary. 21 4 In support of its conclusion that Mrs. Olech's
complaint could "fairly be construed" 21 5 as making adequate allegations,
the Court cited Conley v. Gibson,2 6 a case that had adopted an extremely
forgiving standard in evaluating plaintiffs' complaints. 2 7 The Court
concluded its opinion by making clear that its decision was not based on
the Seventh Circuit's "subjective ill theory" of equal protection, but had
been decided on the "similarly situated" standard, "quite apart" from any
reliance on the village's subjective motivation as a basis for its
decision.1 8
Justice Breyer wrote a brief concurring opinion in Olech in which he
expressed that, without a limiting principle, the majority's opinion could
"transform many ordinary violations of city or state law into violations of
the constitution.,, 2 9 Breyer argued that an appropriate limiting principle
could be found, and that principle was precisely the "subjective ill will"
theory adopted by the court of appeals, but rejected by the majority.220
Breyer concurred only because the presence of that "added factor" (ill
will) would "minimize any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill
22
zoning cases into cases of constitutional right. 1

213. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000).

214. Id.
215. Id. at 565.
216. 355 U.S.41 (1957).
217. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 41, 45-46, which had approved the

"accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him
to relief').
218. Id.
219. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 565.
221. Id. at 566.
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2.

IgnoringPrecedentialCases and a Possible Explanation

The Olech Court's choice of precedents to ignore is as revealing as its
choice of precedents to cite. Once the Court had cited two cases in
support of its substantive position,222 it did not identify or distinguish any
cases that might have suggested a different result. However, if the Court
had been looking for a third property tax assessment case beyond the two
it cited, it might have mentioned Nordlinger v. Hahn.223 That case would
have made it harder for the Court to explain its result in Olech. In
Nordlinger, the individual plaintiff was badly mistreated in relation to
her neighbors in her property tax assessment and paid property taxes
almost five times as high as some of her neighbors.224 Yet the Court
upheld that different treatment because it was the result of a reasonable
system of classification. 5 In Nordlinger, the Court demonstrated no
concern for the individual person unfairly treated. Likewise, the Court in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia showed no identifiable
concern for the individual person adversely affected by governmental
decisionmaking.226 Surely Robert Murgia would take issue with the
assertion that, under Supreme Court precedents, the Equal Protection
Clause protects individuals from arbitrary treatment.
However, a close reading of the Court's citation to Sioux City Bridge
suggests an explanation for the apparently inconsistent results. There, the
Court explained that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional
and arbitrary discrimination "whether occasioned by express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents. 227
This statement explicitly identifies two different forms of state action
subject to the Equal Protection Clause: legislation, on the one hand, and
"execution," on the other.228 It also implicitly suggests a different equal
protection standard to be applied to each form of state action that is
consistent with both views of equal protection. The different standards
would result because of the essential difference between government
legislating, on the one hand, and government acting on the other, through

222. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Sioux
City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

505 U.S. 1 (1992).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 11-13.
See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:367, 2003

individual decisions of government officials that assign government
benefits or impose government burdens on individual persons.
Most of the cases in which the Court has spoken of equal protection as
a limitation on classification have in fact involved legislative
classification.229 When legislatures enact statutes, they ordinarily make
use of broad generalizations about large numbers of people.23 They
assume that people who have a certain trait, like age or gender, are
similarly situated in relation to a particular purpose.23' In short,
legislatures when legislating usually classify.2

2

But if it is generally

accurate to assert that legislatures ordinarily classify, it follows that the
Equal Protection Clause imposes limits on that process of
classification.233 However, in this context, it does no more than that.
Individual persons who are harmed by legislative generalizations that are
not true as applied to them have no remedy, unless the classification
itself is unreasonable.234 In these situations, equal protection is not an
individual right.
It is quite a different story, on the other hand, when government
officials make any of their millions of individual determinations daily.
These include some of the most basic decisions involved in running a
government, such as who gets hired for a government job, who gets fired
from a government job, who gets a zoning waiver, who gets a
government contract, who gets a subdivision approval, who gets a
building permit, who gets a government grant, or who gets arrested.
These governmental decisions are not legislative and do not amount to
229. E.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (legislative age classification);
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (legislative classification on milk
packaging); United States R.R. Ret. Bd.v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (legislative classification on
retirement eligibility standards).
230. E.g., Murgia,427 U.S. 307 (reviewing statute that accepts generalization that fitness declines
with age).
231. E.g., id. (statute assumes that those over 50 are similarly situated in respect to fitness);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (statute assumes that military wives
are financially dependent on their spouses but that military husbands are not financially dependent
on their spouses).
232. See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text. It is not unheard of for a legislature to enact a
law directed at one particular person or entity, rather than at a class, but on the few occasions that
legislatures do this, there are provisions of the Constitution other than the Equal Protection Clause
that limit legislative action. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding New York statute explicitly prohibiting Consolidated Edison Co. from recovering
from ratepayers costs associated with outage at Indian Point 2 Nuclear Facility violated Bill of
Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
233. See supra Part I.
234. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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broad generalizations about large numbers of persons. These are
individual decisions. And here, according to Olech, the Equal Protection
Clause creates a personal right.23 5
In fact, upon careful observation, it must be admitted that one need not
be engaged in the act of classifying at all in order to call the Equal
Protection Clause into play. Because equality arguments are inherently
comparative, there must be at least two persons. However, the basic
mandate of equality that requires similarly situated persons to be treated
similarly does not require classifications. If a parent has only two
children and treats them differently, then that can amount to inequality
without reference to classifications. If a local government treats two
similarly situated neighbors differently in the size of its demand for an
easement, that can constitute inequality. In neither of these cases need a
plaintiff identify a class in order to make an equality claim. A plaintiff
need only prove that he or she was treated differently from one similarly
situated person. In such a case, equal protection is a personal right and
there should be no necessity of referring to a "class of one" because there
is no necessity of identifying a classification.
The Court's opinion in Olech clearly supports such a conclusion, but
the Court did not make clear the conceptual underpinning of that
conclusion. While the result in the case suggests that an individual
plaintiff harmed by an unequal administrative decision has an equal
protection claim without proving membership in a class, the Court's
opinion suggests a slightly different explanation. The language chosen by
the Court in Olech suggests that it is necessary to identify a class, but
that the class can consist of only one member.23 6 Although these two
alternate formulations of the equal protection right recognized in Olech
probably do not create practical differences, it is ironic that the Olech
opinion, in the act of providing the strongest support for an individual
rights view of equal protection, does so by using the traditional language
of equal protection as a limit on classifications.237 Although the Supreme
Court in Olech purported to recognize an existing right and thus not
change existing law, the opinion was far more transformative than the
Court intimated. Olech in fact has had a dramatic effect on subsequent
litigation in federal courts. The next section examines these effects.

235. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
236. Id. at 564 ("Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class
of one."').
237. Id.
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THE AFTERMATH OF OLECH

After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Olech, it was clear that the
Equal Protection Clause does protect individual rights, at least in an
appropriately limited context. 238 But what was the exact nature of that
right? According to the Court, an individual has a valid claim under the
Equal Protection Clause when "she has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment. '239 This is the "similarly situated" equal
protection claim. In addition, according to the Seventh Circuit and
several other courts of appeals, an individual also has a valid claim under
the Equal Protection Clause when a government acts vindictively toward
that person, with the motivation to "get" him. 2 40 This is the "vindictive
action" equal protection claim. Although the Supreme Court did not
affirm the "vindictive action" portion of the Seventh Circuit's Olech
"
opinion, it did not overrule it either.24
' The following section examines
how lower federal courts treated the Supreme Court's Olech decision and
the "vindictive action" equal protection claim.
A.

Did Olech Change Existing Law?

In Olech, the U.S. Supreme Court carefully explained that its decision
validating the "class of one" equal protection claim was nothing new.
According to the Court, "[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal
protection claims brought by a 'class of one.' ' 242 The Court purported to
identify two cases that supported this assertion, one of them decided in
1923.243 Surely then, the Court was of the view that it was simply
restating existing law. Although ultimately that claim is defensible, it is
not without its problems. First, the Court made no effort to distinguish
those cases where it spoke of equal protection as a limitation on
government classifications, with no mention of any protection of
individual rights. Nor did the Court explain why in those cases the harm
238. Although the Equal Protection Clause does not protect individuals from adverse affects of
reasonable legislative classifications, it does protect an individual from an arbitrary individual
administrative decision by a government official. See supra Part III.B.

239. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
240. See supra Part lIl.A.2.

241. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 ("[W]e therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but do
not reach the alternative theory of 'subjective ill will' relied on by that court.").
242. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
243. Id. (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923)).
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to individuals was considered unimportant. Second, the Court did not
explicitly state that its "class of one" holding was limited to the
execution of law by government officials but did not extend to the
enactment of laws by legislatures. However, if the holding of the case is
appropriately limited, then Olech can be viewed as consistent with
previous understandings of the Equal Protection Clause.
The issue of the consistency of Olech with pre-existing precedent
arises explicitly in lower federal courts when defendants raise the
defense of qualified immunity. This occurs when plaintiffs seek money
damages from individual government defendants for violations of
constitutional rights. In these cases, the Supreme Court has announced a
rule that "government officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 2 " When a
plaintiff seeks damages for a "class of one" claim that arose before
February 23, 2000, the date of the Supreme Court opinion in Olech, it
then becomes necessary to determine whether the "class of one" claim
was "clearly established" before that date.
Of the few lower federal court cases that have explicitly considered
this question, there is support for the conclusion that Olech did not
change existing law. When the Olech litigation itself was remanded to a
federal district court in the Northern District of Illinois, that court
addressed the issue of qualified immunity for the defendants and whether
or not the "class of one" equal protection claim was "clearly established"
before 2000.245 The lower court answered in the affirmative, citing both
Seventh Circuit precedent and Sioux City Bridge and Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal.246 In McWaters v. Rick, 247 a federal district court for the
Eastern District of Virginia found that Olech "confirmed that government
officials constitutionally may not apply a law arbitrarily to .

. .

a person

who is similarly situated to others to whom the law has been applied. 248
Thus, the holding in Olech "was not based on novel legal theory... [but]

244. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
245. Olech v. Vill.
of Willowbrook, 2002 WL 31317415, at *23 (N.D. I1. Oct. 10, 2002).
246. Id. at *23. This opinion of the district court amended an earlier opinion issued on May 24,
2002. See id. at *n.l.
247. 195 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Va. 2002).
248. Id.at 806 (emphasis added).
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was confirming and clarifying, rather than revealing for the first time,
that such a 'class of one' claim is constitutionally cognizable. 249
But there is some dissent on this point. In Taylor v. Russell,2 0 a
federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas insisted that,
"[p]rior to Village of Willowbrook, it was generally understood in this
[Fifth] Circuit that an equal protection claim could only succeed if the
disparate treatment at issue was premised upon a person's membership in
a protected class or invocation of a constitutional right.""25 According to
Taylor, it was not at all clear before Olech that a claim of personal
vindictiveness "would be enough to support an equal protection claim
without some other class-based discrimination. "252 Further, in Anderson
v. Anderson,253 a federal district court for the Northern District of Ohio
found that "the Olech opinion invalidates the Futernick rule that
cognizable equal protection claims must be based on class-based or
' The federal district courts in these cases found
group-based treatment."254
that Olech had forced change in the law of their circuits. At the very
least, then, it must be said that, even if the Supreme Court's Olech
opinion did not change the law of the Supreme Court itself, it certainly
forced several lower federal courts to change their views of the Equal
Protection Clause. Surprisingly, however, not every circuit appears to
have received the message. As late as September 2002, more than two
years after Olech, a panel in the Tenth Circuit stated in an unpublished
opinion that, to establish an equal protection violation, "plaintiffs must
show that they are members of a protected class and that the defendants
purposefully discriminated against them because of their membership in
that class. ' 55
B.

Limiting the Effect ofOlech

Both Judge Posner and Justice Breyer expressed the fear that the
Court's Olech decision, unless properly limited, could open the
249, Id.; accord Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp. 2d 647, 664 (W.D.N.C. 2002).

250. 181 F. Supp. 2d 668 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
251, Id. at 672.
252. Id.
253. 2000 WL 33126582 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2000).
254. Id. at *4 (citing Summers v. City of Raymond, 105 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551-52 (S.D. Miss.

2000)).
255. Brown v. Millard County, 47 F. Appx. 882, 890 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Jones v. Union
County, 296 F.3d 417, 426 (6th Cir. 2002)). Judge Hartz, in a concurring opinion, disagreed on this
point. Id. at 890-91 (Hartz, J., concurring).
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floodgates in federal courts to a host of insignificant yet time-consuming
lawsuits.256 In response to this concern, a number of federal courts have
attempted to interpret Olech in a way that would limit its effect. One
such strategy was to read Olech as requiring proof of vindictive
motivation as well as different treatment of similarly situated persons." 7
A second strategy to limit Olech was to interpret the term "intentionally
different treatment" very strictly.258 A third strategy was to interpret the

phrase "similarly situated" very narrowly.2 59 The following section
examines all three of these attempts to limit the effect of the Supreme
Court's Olech opinion.
1.

Limiting Olech by Requiring Both Unequal Treatment and
Subjective Ill Will

The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Olech was short and apparently
rather simple, but some of the federal courts of appeal treated it like a
complex puzzle, to be mined for hidden meaning. Almost immediately
after it was reported, both the Seventh and Second Circuits engaged in
what they must have viewed as damage control, that is, an attempt to
limit Olech so that it would not overrun the federal courts with garden
variety disputes involving claims against local government.
In Hilton v. City of Wheeling,26 ° the first appellate case to cite Olech,
Judge Posner once again wrote for the Seventh Circuit. In his Seventh
Circuit Olech opinion, Judge Posner had found the constitutional
problem to be the subjective ill will that the town officials allegedly held
toward Mrs. Olech. On the other hand, the Supreme Court decided the
case on the ground that the town had intentionally treated Mrs. Olech
different from similarly situated property owners without adequate
justification.26 ' It has been noted that these two explanations of the result
256. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The
Solicitor General and the Village of Willowbrook have expressed concern lest we interpret the Equal
Protection Clause in this case in a way that would transform many ordinary violations of city or state
law into violations of the Constitution."); Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th
Cir. 1998) ("Of course, we are troubled, as was the district judge, by the prospect of turning every
squabble over municipal services, of which there must be tens or even hundreds of thousands every
year, into a federal constitutional case.").
257. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
258. See infra Part IV.B.2.

259. See infra Part IV.B.3,
260. 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000).

261. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
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in Olech are quite different,262 and the Supreme Court seemed to have
adopted only one.
But Judge Posner was not willing to concede this point. In Hilton,
Judge Posner addressed a claim of unequal provision of police protection
as an equal protection violation.263 In rejecting that claim, Judge Posner
explained that, while the police may have been inept or may have been
deceived by the plaintiffs neighbors, it did not matter.264 What mattered,
said Judge Posner, "is the absence of evidence of an improper motive. 265
How could Judge Posner have read the Olech opinion to require evidence
of improper motive? Judge Posner pointed to the language of the
Supreme Court opinion indicating that the allegation of dissimilar
treatment must include the claim that there is "no rational basis" for the
difference in treatment and that the different treatment was "irrational
and wholly arbitrary.' 66 According to Judge Posner, this "no rational
basis" language must necessarily include a gloss that "to make out a
prima facie case the plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant
deliberately sought to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws for
reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant's
position., 267 Judge Posner then cited his own Seventh Circuit Olech
opinion, rather than the Supreme Court's opinion, to show that what was
required was "proof that the cause of the differential treatment of which
the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate animus toward the
plaintiff by the defendant. 268
Judge Posner's opinion in Hilton is surprising. First, it ignores the per
curiam opinion of the Supreme Court, which explicitly stated that it did
"not reach the alternative theory of 'subjective ill will' relied on by the
[Seventh Circuit]. 2 69 Second, it exalts Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion, which did require "ill will" as a component of a "class of one"
claim, as well as Judge Posner's previous Seventh Circuit opinion, to the
status of Supreme Court majority opinion. Judge Posner's reading of
Olech is inconsistent with the per curiam opinion in that case. But
whether grounded in precedent or not, Judge Posner's view, both because
262. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
263. Hilton, 209 F.3d at 1006-07.
264. Id. at 1008.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000).
Id. (citing Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir.1998)).
Olech. 528 U.S. at 565.
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of his scholarly reputation and his position as Chief Judge of the Seventh
Circuit and because Hilton was one of the first cases to interpret Olech,
gave that position a great deal of credibility and influence. This created
problems for subsequent courts interpreting Olech.
It certainly created difficulties for the Seventh Circuit. Shortly after
Hilton, a different panel of Seventh Circuit judges adopted apparently
contradictory interpretations of Olech. The court initially held that a
"class of one" equal protection claim could be made either by showing
different treatment of similarly situated persons or by showing a "spiteful
effort to 'get' [a person]."27 Later in the same opinion, the court also
held that in order to make a "class of one" claim, a plaintiff must show
different treatment of similarly situated persons and "totally illegitimate
animus., ' 271 Two subsequent Seventh Circuit opinions approvingly cited
Hilton as requiring proof of illegitimate animus in order to make out a
claim under Olech.272 These three cases suggest that the Seventh Circuit
is free to come up with its own interpretations of Supreme Court
precedents.
However, more recent opinions have retreated from the more extreme
view expressed in Hilton. For example, in Nevel v. Village of
Schaumburg,273 the Seventh Circuit explicitly stated the two "class of
one" tests disjunctively. In Nevel, the court concluded that, to succeed
under Olech, the plaintiff must prove either intentionally different
treatment of similarly situated persons or illegitimate animus toward the
plaintiff.274 A subsequent district court opinion from the Seventh Circuit

reviewed the confusion on the meaning of Olech and concluded that
Nevel:
[S]tates the proper standards governing class of one equal
protection claims. Nevel is more faithful to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Olech .... The Seventh Circuit's subsequent attempts in

Hilton and Purze to narrow the range of options available to class
of one equal protection plaintiffs simply cannot be squared with
Olech.275
270. Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2001).
271. Id.
272. Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2001); Purze v. Viii. of Winthrop
Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002).
273. 297 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002).
274. Id. at 681.
275. Northwestern Univ. v. City of Evanston, 2002 WL 31027981, at *4 (N.D. I11.Sept. 11,
2002). Accord Panthera v. Viii. of Oaklawn, 2002 WL 31269486, at *9 (N.D. III. Oct. 10, 2002).
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The Second Circuit has had its own problems in interpreting the
meaning of the Supreme Court's Olech opinion. Even before Olech, the
Second Circuit had already developed a two-part test in cases of selective
treatment that anticipated the alternative interpretations of Olech. In
276
Leclair v. Saunders,
the Second Circuit considered an allegation of an
equal protection violation in the selective enforcement of a dairy farm
regulation. 77 The court explained that liability would depend on proof
that "(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was
selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on
impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or
punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith
intent to injure a person.,, 278 This two-part test seems to be virtually the
same conjunctive test used by Judge Posner in his interpretation of
Olech. But how much of Judge Posner's test has survived the Supreme
Court's Olech opinion?
The Second Circuit has had a difficult time in determining exactly
how much is left of the LeClair standard after Olech. In three separate
attempts at explaining the effect of Olech, the Second Circuit did not
resolve the issue of whether a plaintiff must prove both elements of the
LeClair standard or only one of them. 79 In each of the cases, the court
found that it did not need to decide that issue because in each case, the
plaintiff was unable to prove either element. 280 However, the most recent
cases from the district courts within the Second Circuit now seem to be
of the view that in order to make a "class of one" claim, a plaintiff must
prove either intentionally different treatment of similarly situated persons
28
or subjective ill will. 1

276. 627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1980).
277. Id. at 607-08.
278. Id. at 609-10.
279. Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740 (2d Cir. 2001); Harlen Assocs. v. Viii. of
Mineola, 273 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 2001); Gelb v. Bd. of Elections, 224 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2000).
280. Giordano, 274 F.2d at 751("[W]e decline to resolve this issue because its resolution would

not affect the outcome of this appeal."); Harlen, 273 F.3d at 500 ("We need not decide which
reading is the correct one in order to resolve this case, as Harlen's claim fails even if no showing of
animus is required."); Gelb, 224 F.3d at 157 ("Although we do not foreclose the possibility of
summary judgment in favor of the City Board, we note that summary judgment is generally
inappropriate where questions of intent and state of mind are implicated."); but see Jackson v. Burke,
256 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2001) (assuming that "proof of subjective ill will is not an essential element
of a 'class of one' equal protection claim," but dismissing case because plaintiff had not shown any
evidence that he was being treated from others similarly situated).

281. Payne v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 31039460, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 26,
2002) (indicating that to survive motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must prove that the
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The most recent cases from the Seventh and Second Circuits thus
seem to make clear that previous attempts to limit Olech by requiring
subjective ill will does not work. The work of limiting Olech, if it is to
succeed, must adopt a different strategy. The next section examines one
such alternate method.
2.

Limiting Olech By Imposing a Strict Intent Standard

The U.S. Supreme Court in Olech held that a "class of one" claim was
made out when the plaintiff alleged "that she has been intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment. '28 2 An alternative method to
limit Olech is to interpret the term "intentionally" in a very restrictive
way. This was the strategy adopted by the Second Circuit in Giordano v.
City of New York.283
In Giordano, a police officer was terminated from his position
because of his use of the blood thinner, Coumadin. 8 4 The plaintiffs
equal protection claim was that there was another New York City police
officer, also using Coumadin and thus similarly situated, who had not
been terminated.285 The court rejected this claim on the grounds that,
because there was no evidence that the police officials who had made the
decision to terminate Giordano were also aware of this other officer, they
could not have intended to treat Giordano differently from other
officers. 286 This interpretation of the word "intentionally," is at first
glance counterintuitive because it seems to reward ignorance by local
officials. As long as an official makes sure he does not know the status of
other similarly situated persons, he cannot be found to have intentionally
motivation for the disparate treatment was ill will or for wholly arbitrary reasons lacking any
rational basis); Padilla v. Harris, 2002 WL 750856, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2002) ("The Court
cannot ignore the plain language of the Supreme Court in Olech that allegations that a plaintiff 'has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment' were sufficient to state a claim for denial of equal protection.");
Barstow v. Shea, 196 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (D. Conn. 2002) ("To prevail on a 'class of one' equal
protection claim, plaintiff must 'show, not only "irrational and wholly arbitrary" acts, but also
intentional disparate treatment."'); Tuchman v. Bechem Transp., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173 (D.
Conn. 2002) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss because plaintiffs had alleged neither
dissimilar treatment nor animus).
282. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (emphasis added).
283. 274 F.3d. 740 (2d Cir. 2001).
284. Id. at 742.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 751-52.
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violated a plaintiffs equal protection rights. A more obvious
interpretation of the term "intentionally" would simply have meant that
police officials intended to terminate Giordano because of his use of
Coumadin, without regard to their conscious awareness of other officers
in the same situation who were not being terminated. It is of little
comfort to the officer laid off because of his use of Coumadin that, even
though other officers in his situation received better treatment, police
officials were not aware of those other officers.
However, there is ample support for the restrictive use of the term
"intentionally" that was adopted by the court in Giordano. In 1944, long
before Olech, the Supreme Court considered what was necessary to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in Snowden v. Hughes.287 In
Snowden, the plaintiff alleged that certain officials had violated state law
in not certifying him for the Republican nomination to the state assembly
and, in so doing, had violated his equal protection rights.288 The Court
rejected the claim, explaining that:
[N]ot every denial of a right conferred by state law involves a
denial of the equal protection of the laws, even though the denial of
the right to one person may operate to confer it on another. [A]n
erroneous or mistaken performance of [a] statutory duty, although a
violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.28
The "something more" that would turn such an act into an equal
protection violation, explained the Court, is "an element of intentional or
purposeful discrimination." 9 ' For example, according to the Court, if
state officials did not assess property uniformly for the purpose of
imposing property taxes, "[i]t is not enough to establish a denial of equal
protection that some are assessed at a higher valuation than others. The
difference must be due to a purposeful discrimination.""29 Thus, in
Snowden, the Court found that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged
that the Canvassing Board purposefully discriminated against him in
favor of another.2 92 The Second Circuit's opinion in Giordano is
consistent with this restrictive interpretation.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

321 U.S. 1 (1944).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
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Other post-Olech courts have also interpreted the term "intentionally"
in this same strict manner with the effect of limiting the reach of Olech.
In Payne v. Huntington Union Free School District,293 the court rejected
the equal protection claim of a part-time teacher who had been
terminated, because of the absence of evidence of intentionally different
treatment. 294 The court explained that in order to meet this standard, the
plaintiff would have to prove "that the Board knew it was treating her
differently than it [was treating] other similarly situated individuals. ' 95
Thus, even if the plaintiff could identify individuals similar to herself
whom the school board treated differently, that would not establish an
equal protection claim in the absence of evidence that this different
treatment was intentional. This was a standard too difficult for the
plaintiff in Payne to satisfy.
In Pariseau v. City of Brockton,296 the court rejected an equal
protection claim arising out of a failure by police to dispatch a cruiser in
response to a 911 call reporting a robbery.2 97 The court found that the
claim did not satisfy the intent standard set forth in Olech, since "[t]he
arbitrariness of a law enforcement decision is not, without more,
sufficient to state an equal protection claim., 298 The court, citing Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion in Olech, explained that when differential
treatment results from ineptness rather than design, there is no
violation. 299 Thus, the court in Pariseau found that, "[e]ven if the
decision not to dispatch a cruiser immediately lacked a rational basis, the
equal protection claim cannot succeed unless Plaintiffs can make a
threshold showing of the requisite discriminatory intent."300 The
plaintiffs in Pariseauwere unable to show either a "purposeful scheme
not to protect white complainants" or "a custom or policy ... to provide
less protection to victims of a particular kind of crime.""3 1
Even in those cases where plaintiffs succeed in making "class of one"
claims, they must overcome the hurdle of a strict "intent" standard.
When the Olech case itself was remanded to the district court, that court
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

2002 WL 31039460 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2002).
Id. at *8.
Id.
135 F. Supp. 2d 257 (D. Mass. 2001).
Id.at 260.
Id. at 263.
Id. (citing Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
Id. at 264.

301. Id.
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refused to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment, at least
in part because of the question of intent.3" 2 While it was clear that the
Village had "intended" to demand the 33-foot easement from Mrs.
Olech, it was not clear whether the Village "intended" to treat her
differently from other similarly situated individuals.30 3 The court found
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Village
in fact knew of other similar landowners.3" 4 Only if they did know of that
other treatment at the time they demanded something different from Mrs.
Olech could it be proven that they "intended" to treat Mrs. Olech
differently.3" 5
In McWaters v. Rick, another post-Olech case, a federal district court
in the Eastern District of Virginia imposed a strict intent standard. The
plaintiffs equal protection claim was that a local board, of which she
was a member, had investigated her travel expenses but not those of a
similarly situated colleague, and also that the board had refused to
reimburse her legal expenses incurred in the investigation while paying
those of her colleague.30 6 Although the court upheld her claim at the
pleading stage, it did insist that she satisfy a demanding intent standard.
The court explained, "to prove that a statute has been administered [in a
discriminatory manner], more must be shown than the fact that a benefit
was denied to one person while conferred on another. A violation is
established only if the plaintiff can prove that the state intended to
discriminate. '37 The court then showed that the required intent means
"more than intent as volition or awareness. It implies that the
decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group [or person].""3 8
This demanding standard would require McWaters to prove, not only
that the board had in fact treated her differently from another board
member, but that the board had done so because it wanted to discriminate
against her. Such a standard would have the effect of eliminating equal
protection claims where the conduct, although arbitrary and not
defensible, results from mere inattention or accident. In McWaters,
302. Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 2002 WL 31317415, at *13 (N.D. 111.Oct. 10, 2002).

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
McWaters v. Rick, 195 F. Supp. 2d 781, 787 (E.D. Va. 2002).
Id. at 792.
Id. at 781 (citing Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
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however, the federal district court found that the plaintiff had in fact
alleged such intentional discrimination and thus refused to dismiss her
claim on the pleadings.3" 9
It seems clear that the requirement that plaintiffs prove "intentional"
discrimination as construed in the preceding cases is likely to limit the
success of "class of one" claims and is thus also likely to limit the
number of such claims.
3.

Limiting Olech By A Restrictive Interpretationof "Similarly
Situated"

Another technique to limit the effect of Olech is to apply a very
restrictive interpretation of the term "similarly situated." As argued
earlier, the oldest version of equality is the idea that similarly situated
persons must be treated similarly. 310 But it has always been a vexing
problem to determine what it means to be similarly situated. As Tussman
and tenBroek demonstrated, the idea of "similarly situated" is incoherent
in the abstract.31' Since each human is like all other humans in an infinite
variety of ways (and thus we are all similar) and, at the same time, each
human is different from every other human in an infinite number of ways
(and thus we are all different). Tussman and tenBroek found a way out of
this incoherence by insisting that we relate the classification to the
purpose on account of which it was made in order to determine who is
similarly situated to whom.3" 2 But their analysis also suggests that the
concept of who is similarly situated to whom is a manipulable device. On
the one hand, the concept can be stretched by identifying a large number
of persons who are similar to the plaintiff, thus making it easy for a
plaintiff to insist on similar treatment. On the other hand, the concept can
be shrunk by identifying only a small number of persons, or no persons,
who are similar to the plaintiff, thus making it difficult for a plaintiff to
claim a right to similar treatment. This latter strategy has been used by
some courts to limit the effect of Olech.

309. Id. at 793 (concluding that plaintiff McWaters had alleged an "arbitrary, irrational, and
intentionally discriminatory act to investigate [her] alone" and that thus her complaint had alleged
"a cognizable equal protection claim").
310. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
311. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1,at 345 ("First, 'similarly situated' cannot mean simply

'similar in the possession of the classifying trait.' All members of any class are similarly situated in
this respect and consequently, any classification whatsoever would be reasonable by this test.").
312. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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The problem arises because the Supreme Court's opinion in Olech,
with its reference to "intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated, '' 31 3 appears to leave the impression that "similarly
situated" is a self-defining term, without reference to any exterior
criterion. This leaves the lower courts a great deal of discretion in
deciding to whom the plaintiff ought to be compared and thus who is
similar to him or her. Of course at the very least, it seems that a plaintiff
needs to identify other similarly situated individuals who were treated
differently." 4 Since equality claims necessarily involved a comparison, it
is not enough to allege that you alone have been treated unfairly. 3 5 But
the "similarly situated" requirement can be used to demand quite a bit
more.
For example, in Payne, a federal district court for the Eastern District
of New York considered the termination of a part-time teacher whose
31 6
husband happened to be the superintendent of the school district.
Plaintiffs equal protection claim was that, while she had been fired
because of her relationship to the superintendent, there were over one
hundred other, similarly situated individuals, that is, employees of the
school district who were related to other employees, who had not been
fired.3" 7 In the alternative, the plaintiff could have accepted a narrower
identification of the similarly situated class, that is, those "related
individuals who are in supervisory-subordinate relationships."3 ' 8 The
court rejected both comparison groups as not sufficiently similar. The
court's interpretation of the term required that the comparison [of]
individuals be "very similar indeed,, 3 9 and "similarly situated in all
material respects. ' 320 Because no employee of the school district (other
than plaintiffs husband who was the superintendent) had the power to
supervise all other employees, the result was that there was no other
employee similarly situated to the superintendent and thus no other
313. Viii. ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
314. See, e.g., Presnick v. Town of Orange, 152 F. Supp. 2d 215, 224-25 (D. Conn. 2001) (citing
Nassau County v. County of Nassau, 106 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) for the proposition
that "'class of one' plaintiffs are not relieved from the burden of showing that other similarly
situated people were treated differently").
315. But see supra Part 111.2.B for Judge Posner's somewhat different "vindictive action" version
of equal protection, which apparently does not require an explicit comparison.
316. Payne v. Huntington Free Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 31039460, * I (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2002)

317. id. at *5.
318. Id.
319. Idat *6.
320. Id.
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relative similarly situated to the plaintiff.32 ' Thus the plaintiff could not
make a valid equal protection claim.322
The federal district court in Payne might have treated the plaintiffs
claim more generously by applying the "similarly situated" requirement
in a more relaxed fashion. For example, the comparison class could have
been viewed as all those employees who are directly supervised by a
relative. There were such employees in the school system and not all of
these relationships were prohibited.323 But by insisting that any
prospective members of the comparison class not differ in any way from
the plaintiff, the court virtually foreordained the result that the plaintiff
could not find any similarly situated persons and thus her equal
protection claim would fail.
In Campagna v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection,324 the plaintiff was a state employee who had
been disciplined and who alleged unequal treatment in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.3 25 A federal district court for the District of
Massachusetts rejected the claim, finding that "the applicability of the
'class of one' theory to an employment-based equal protection claim
seems dubious. 3 26 The court was concerned that:
[A]ny public employee convinced that someone similarly situated
is being treated more favorably could sue his or her employer under
the Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of equal protection.
Since practically every employee, public or private, is bound to be
convinced at some point that he or she is getting the short end of
the stick, it is not hard to imagine the bee hive of constitutional
litigation that would be generated by this variant of the "class of
one" doctrine.327
But the court in Compagna found an easy way out of this dilemma by
applying a very strict measure of what it meant to be "similarly
situated. ' 3 28 The plaintiff was an environmental engineer. 329 He was

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at*7.
Id. at * 12 (granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment).
Id. at *5.
206 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Mass. 2002).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 121.
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disciplined, inter alia, for failing to complete a required form. 330 His
equal protection argument was that two other inspectors had also failed
to file the required forms, but had not been disciplined.33 ' The court
rejected the claim on the ground that the two other inspectors were not
similarly situated to the plaintiff. Specifically, they were different first,
because "rightly or wrongly" the department considered that they did
their work competently while the plaintiff did not, and second, because
the plaintiff had performed his inspection as part of his private afterhours business, while the two others had performed their inspections as
part of the work as state employees.332 Thus, according to the court, these
differences "warranted stricter treatment for [the] plaintiff."333
However, the plaintiff in Compagna would have identified the proper
comparison differently. In the plaintiffs view, all those who are required
to complete an inspection form should be treated the same.334 On the
other hand, from the perspective of the state defendant and for the federal
district court, the requirement that a form be completed did not apply in
the same way to all form-filers. Those whom the department considered
to do competent work or who filled out forms as department employees
were not held to the same standard as others.335 Or to put it in other
terms, all form filers are equal, but some are more equal than others.
While the federal district court may well have been correct in concluding
that the plaintiff in Compagna had no valid equal protection claim, the
result in the case also suggests that a court can always find differences if
it is so inclined.
A federal district court for the District of Massachusetts in Lakeside
Builders Inc. v. PlanningBoard of the Town of Franklin336 also applied a
strict interpretation of "similarly situated" in rejecting the plaintiffs
claim. In that case, the plaintiff, a builder, had requested a waiver of a
subdivision requirement about the length of dead-end roads, but the
request was denied.337 Plaintiffs equal protection claim arose from the

330. Id. at 122-23.
331. Id. at 123.
332. Id. at 127.
333. Id.
334. Id. ("Plaintiff contends that he was similarly situated to [two other employees] who were not
fined despite the fact that they also failed properly to complete the form in conjunction with their
inspections of the Westfield property.").
335. Id.
336. 2002 WL 31655250 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2002).
337. Id. at *1.
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fact that the planning board had approved waivers of that requirement in
twenty-one subdivision developments,338 and, according to plaintiff,
these other situations were similar to its own and thus required the
planning board to treat it similarly.339 But the court found the plaintiffs
complaint to be inadequate because it "[did] not propose any standard by
which to judge whether one applicant for a waiver was 'similarly
situated' to another. Rather, it simply asserts in conclusory fashion that
the plaintiffs were treated differently from other similarly situated
applicants."34 The court was unwilling to conclude "that all applicants
should be considered 'similarly situated' simply because they had all
made requests for waivers of the dead-end street length regulation.""34
It was not enough that all of the comparison group had applied for a
waiver. The court indicated that it would "want to know a good deal
more about the merits of individual applicants before deciding who was
similarly situated to whom. '

342

As the court noted, it would not make

sense to assume that all applicants to a particular college were similarly
situated, and would thus have to be treated similarly, simply because
they had all applied to that particular college. 43 Likewise, the court
found that in the case before it, the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient
facts for the court to determine who, of all those requesting waivers, was
similar to whom.144 As the Lakeside Builders court explained, "Exact
correlation is neither likely nor necessary, but the cases must be fair
congeners. In other words, apples must be compared to apples., 345 Thus,

once again a relatively strict interpretation of the term "similarly
situated" lead to the dismissal of a plaintiff's "class of one" claim.
C.

How Olech Made It Easier ForPlaintiffs in FederalCourts

1.

Creatinga Powerful New Precedent

Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's assertion that Olech
merely recognized existing law, and notwithstanding the efforts by some
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. (comparing applicants for land use waivers with applicants to college).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989)).
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federal courts to limit its effect, Olech is a powerful new precedent that
has changed litigation in the federal courts. The Supreme Court's
decision explicitly validated the individual equal protection claim that
alleges intentionally different treatment of similarly situated persons.346
In addition, while not endorsing the concept, the Olech opinion also
called attention to the "vindictive action" version of that claim that had
been widespread in the Seventh Circuit. 347 Since Olech, plaintiffs citing
the case have made successful "class of one" arguments in a surprisingly
high percentage of cases.345
Before Olech, this success would not have been expected. It has long
been understood that rational basis equal protection claims, that is, those
that do not involve heightened scrutiny because of a suspect class or
fundamental right, have very little chance of success, because courts
usually adopt an extremely deferential attitude. 34 9 During a recent
twenty-five year period, the Supreme Court decided one hundred ten
rational basis cases and the plaintiff prevailed in only ten of these, for a
success rate of only nine percent.350 One would imagine then, that "class
of one" equal protection claims, which rarely involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, would rarely be successful. After Olech, that is no
longer true. In the first eighty-six federal district court opinions after
Olech that cite Olech and the term "class of one," plaintiffs prevailed in
thirty,35' for a success rate of thirty-five percent. This is an unexpectedly
346. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)
347. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
348. See infra note 351.
349. See Farrell, supra note 204, at 358-59.
350. Id. at 370.
351. These statistics were obtained from the following Westlaw search of federal district courts:
[olech & "class of one" & date (aft 02/23/2000) & date (before 9/22/2002)]. That search produced
86 cases. Of that 86, plaintiffs prevailed in the following 30 cases: Northwestern Univ. v. City of
Evanston, 2002 WL 31027981 (N.D. 111.Sept. 11,2002); Kiser v. Naperville Cmty. Unit, 2002 WL
2010185 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2002); Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 2002 WL 2005464 (W.D.N.C. Aug.
26, 2002); Carr v. Vill. of Willow Springs, 2002 WL 1559665 (N.D. II1. July 16, 2002); Britell v.
United States, 204 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Mass. 2002); Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 2002 WL
1058843 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2002); Padilla v. Harris, 2002 WL 750856 (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2002);
McWaters v. Rick, 195 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Va. 2002); Tapalian v. Town of Seekonk, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 136 (D. Mass. 2002); Stone v. Hope, 2002 WL 663468 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2002); Barstow
v. Shea, 196 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Conn. 2002); Russo v. City of Hartford, 184 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D.
Conn. 2002); Eisen v. Temple Univ., 2002 WL 32706 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002); Am. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. of Chic. v. Town of Cicero, 2001 WL 1631871 (N.D. 111.Dec. 14, 2001); Oneto v. Town
of Hamden, 169 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D. Conn. 2001); Tropical Air Flying Servs., Inc. v. Carmen
Feliciano de Melecio, 158 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.P.R. 2001); Caudell v. City of Toccoa, 153 F. Supp.
2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Britell v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Mass. 2001); McDonald
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high percentage which suggests both that Olech is having a significant
impact on the federal courts, and that Justice Breyer's and Judge
Posner's concerns about the explosion of federal cases were welljustified.
A number of these successful claims appear to involve rather trivial
matters that traditionally would not have made their way into federal
court. For example, a state employee prevailed where the state required
her to complete a medical incident report before leaving work because of
illness.352 An air ambulance service prevailed where local government
selected its rival as a provider.353 A builder prevailed where a town
issued a stop work order on construction work already begun.354 The
owner of a mobile home park prevailed where he disagreed with the
town's decision to install a particular kind of water and sewer meters at
his park.355 And a developer prevailed where a town refused to approve
his subdivision plan.356 Although other cases citing Olech were of a more
substantial nature, the successes just cited are evidence of an equal
protection jurisprudence that must be quite far removed from the intent
of the framers.
This next section examines some of these successful "class of one"
equal protection claims in the federal courts. Most of these successes
have come at the pre-trial stages of a lawsuit, that is, at the time of a
motion to dismiss or at the time of a motion for summary judgment. The
cases examined will demonstrate how difficult it can be, after Olech, for
a government defendant to get a suit dismissed at the early stages of a
lawsuit.

v. Viii. of Winnetka, 2001 WL 477148 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001); Northwestern Univ. v. City of
Evanston, 2001 WL 219632 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2001); Zavatsky v. Anderson, 130 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D.
Conn. 2001); Frevach Land Co. v. Multnomah County Dep't of Envtl. Servs., 2000 WL 1875839 (D.
Or. Dec. 21, 2000); Byers v. Ill. State Police, 2000 WL 1741723 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2000); Anderson
v. Vii1. of Oswego, 109 F. Supp. 2d 930 (N.D.Ili. 2000); Baumgardner v. County of Cook, 108 F.
Supp. 2d 1041 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Westfall v. City of Grand Forks, 2000 WL 33339627 (D.N.D. Aug
02, 2000); Econ. Opportunity Comm'n of Nassau County, Inc. v. County of Nassau, 106 F. Supp. 2d
433 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 2000 WL 967980 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2000);
Michelfelder v. Bensalem Township Sch. Dist., 2000 WL 892866 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2000);
Singleton v. Chic. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 2000 WL 777925 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2000).
352. Barstow v. Shea, 196 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Conn. 2002).
353. Tropical Air Flying Servs., Inc. v. Carmen Feliciano de Melecio, 158 F. Supp. 2d 177
(D.P.R. 2001).
354. Frevach Land Co. v. Multnomah County Dep't of Envtl. Servs., 2000 WL 1875839 (D. Or.
Dec. 21, 2000).
355. Stone v. Hope, Ind., 2002 WL 663468 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2002).
356. Tapalian v. Town of Seekonk, 188 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D. Mass. 2002).
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Rejecting Defendants' Motions To Dismiss

Probably the most significant effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's
Olech opinion is that it is now far more difficult for government
defendants to have a case dismissed on the pleadings. Although it has
never been possible for local government officials to prevent equal
protection law suits from being filed against them, the damage from
those suits to local government can be minimized if the suits can be
dismissed at a very early stage, before discovery has taken place, before
trial preparations have been made, and before the trial itself. Under
traditional equal protection doctrine, rational basis claims are very
commonly dismissed on the pleadings as a result of the extremely
deferential standard that courts have traditionally applied in rational basis
cases. The Supreme Court articulated a sweeping version of this
deferential attitude in Federal Communications Commission v. Beach
Communications Inc.,357 where it stated that "[i]n areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification ... must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. 358 Under
this standard, "those attacking the rationality of the legislative
classification have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which
might support it,"' 359 and "legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
36
evidence or empirical data.

1

When courts apply the rationality standard deferentially, a complaint
cannot be drafted that would survive a motion to dismiss. A plaintiff
would have to "hypothesize all conceivable justifications for a statutory
classification and then prove that no legislative body could 'rationally
have believed' that the classification served [any of] the hypothesized
purpose[s].

' 36 1

But federal district courts seem to have read Olech as

overturning much of this accepted wisdom, at least in the context of
equal protection challenges to administrative decisions by local officials.

357. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
358. Id. at 313.

359. Id. at 315.
360. Id.
361. Long Island Lighting v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 420 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing W. & S.
Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 672 (1981)), vacated in part, 888 F.2d 230
(2d Cir. 1989). See Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality
Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 38-40 (1992).

Classes or Persons?

In contrast to the insurmountable burden for plaintiffs that previous
courts suggested, some post-Olech cases suggest a far more relaxed
362 the plaintiff challenged
pleading standard. In Russo v. City of Hartford,
his suspension from the police force on equal protection grounds.363 A
federal district court for the District of Connecticut rejected the city's
motion to dismiss because "Russo has alleged that similarly situated
individuals were treated differently and that the defendants have not
expressed any legitimate basis for the differential treatment.''364 This
statement suggests that the court assumes that the defendant has the
burden of showing the legitimate basis for the different treatment. But
that assumption is surely inconsistent with the strong presumption of
validity accorded government action in rational basis cases and with the
365 The
"any conceivable basis" language of Beach Communications.
court in Russo was in fact quite aware of these presumptions,
acknowledging that "defendants are under no obligation to provide a
rational basis for the alleged violation; the court can dismiss the count on
the pleadings if it can conceive of any rational basis for the
classification. 36 6 Notwithstanding that acknowledgment, the court went
on to say that it "refuses, however, to speculate as to conceivable rational
bases for the defendants' actions. ' 367 As a result of the court's refusal to
speculate, the case was not dismissed on the pleadings and thus the city
of Hartford was forced to continue to litigate the case.368
Stone v. Hope, Indiana369 is another post-Olech case where a federal
district court in the Southern District of Indiana appeared to bend over
backward to help the plaintiff survive a motion to dismiss. In that case,
the plaintiff complained that the town had arbitrarily refused his request
for individual water meters at his mobile home park while treating other
trailer park owners differently. 37" Even though the plaintiff had not made
his allegations with particularity, the court refused to dismiss the case.37'
"All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the Plaintiff.

362. 184 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Conn. 2002).
363. Id. at 190.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
Id. at 195-96 (citing Connolly v. McCall, 254 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197-98.
2002 WL 663468 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2002).
Id. at *4.

371. Id.
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Under this standard, the Plaintiff has provided Defendants with fair
notice of his claims and the grounds upon which they are based., 372 This
"fair notice" standard announced by the court in Stone is a very far
distance from the "any conceivable basis" the Supreme Court used in
Beach Communications.Beach Communications suggests that the burden
is entirely on the plaintiff to identify and disprove all of the defendant's
possible justifications.37 3 The standard in Stone is almost exactly the
opposite. It suggests that the plaintiff need only give notice in a general
way of his equal protection claim and that will be sufficient to get him to
the next stage of the litigation.
Although some courts have interpreted the "similarly situated"
requirement quite strictly in order to eliminate claims, 3 74 that standard

has sometimes been treated very generously in order to allow plaintiffs to
3 75
survive a motion to dismiss. In Kiser v. Naperville Community Unit,
the plaintiff had been terminated from his position as executive
administrator and attorney for a school district. 376 In moving to dismiss
the claim, the school district argued that the plaintiff had not alleged that
any other lawyers were employed by the district, and that, without such a
group against which to compare the plaintiff, he had not stated an equal
protection claim.

377

A federal district court in the Northern District of

Illinois rejected that argument on the grounds that "[t]he potential
relevance of other lawyers is obvious from the complaint" and thus that
the plaintiff need not make the comparison explicitly. 378 Thus, on the

basis of a rather vague complaint that had made no attempt to identify
specific individuals who were similar but had been treated differently,
the court found that a valid equal protection claim had been made.
In addition to the problems that government defendants have had in
getting "similarly situated" "class of one" claims dismissed, courts have
also made it more difficult for a governmental defendant to have
"vindictive action" claims dismissed. In Singleton v. Chicago School
Reform Board,379 a federal district court for the Northern District of
Illinois refused to dismiss, "[s]ince this Court cannot examine the
372. Id.
373. FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993).
374. See supra notes Part IV. B.3.
375. 2002 WL 2010185 (N.D. 111.
Aug. 29, 2002).
376. Idat *2.

377. Id. at *14.
378. Id.
379. 2000 WL 777925 (N.D. III. June 13, 2000).
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pleadings and magically determine the Defendants' state of mind at the
time of their alleged unlawful actions, we must accept Plaintiffs
allegations [of sheer vindictive purposes] to be true."3 ° In Northwestern
University v. City of Evanston,38' a federal district court for the Northern
District of Illinois explained that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the
university did not need to prove its claims in order to avoid dismissal.3 82
It was enough "simply [to] allege that it was treated differently and that
' The
the City's actions were irrational, arbitrary and even vindictive."3 83
Evanston court found this standard satisfied in the university's
allegations that the city's decision to include some of the university's
property in a historic district was "motivated by the... illegitimate
desire to disregard the University's... right to be exempt from property
taxes," and "by vindictiveness against the University for its refusal to
accede to the City's demand for revenue payments in lieu of property
' Finally, in
taxes."384
Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure,38 5 a federal district court
for the Western District of North Carolina, although conceding that
claims "must be alleged with sufficient specificity to avoid being
conclusory," insisted that "there is no heightened pleading requirement
imposed on the plaintiff. 38 6 The Hyatt court found that the plaintiff had
satisfied these standards with a nonspecific claim that "she ha[d] been
treated differently from others similarly situated," and that "Defendants
acted with 'personal malice' towards her and that the Defendants acted
'
arbitrarily and capriciously."3 87
The relaxed standard adopted by the courts in these cases appears to
turn on its head the previous presumption in rational basis cases that
plaintiffs must counter all conceivable justifications for government
action. Instead, these cases make it substantially easier for a plaintiff to
survive a motion to dismiss and thus force the government defendant to
continue to litigate the case, through discovery, summary judgment, and
possibly trial.

380. Id. at *10.

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

2001 WL 219632 (N.D. 111.Mar. 6, 2001).
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
2002 WL 2005464 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2002).

386. Id. at *11 (citing McWaters v. Rick, 195 F. Supp. 2d 781, 791 (E.D. Va. 2002)).

387. Hyatt, 2002 WL 2005464, at * 11.
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Rejecting Defendants' Motionsfor Summary Judgment

Traditionally, courts have also been very deferential to defendants at
the summary judgment stage when deciding rational basis equal
protection claims.388 A motion for summary judgment is not to be granted
unless "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and .. the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."3 9 But where a
court has determined that the actual motivation of a government actor is
not relevant, then the parties' dispute over that motivation does not
constitute a material fact. 39 ° Thus, government defendants have
traditionally been able to have cases thrown out at the summary
" ' But, after
judgment stage.39
Olech, that traditional wisdom has been
drawn into question in "class of one" cases, where the courts now appear
to be far more deferential to plaintiffs.
In Evanston, the court, contrary to the traditional wisdom, considered
evidence of actual motive as part of a motion for summary judgment.392
In that case, the university complained that it had been singled out for
inclusion in an historic preservation district in retaliation for its refusal to
adjust its tax exempt status.393 With regard to the claim of illegitimate
animus and vindictive motivation as an equal protection violation, the
court explained that "[a] vindictive action equal protection claim, unlike
its traditional counterpart, requires scrutiny of the legislature's actual
' Because
subjective motivation."394
the city and the university disagreed
about what had motivated the city's actions, the court found that there
was a genuine issue of material fact and that it would not grant summary
judgment.395 Noticeably missing from the Evanston court's opinion was
any suggestion that the court or the city might justify the city's action by
reference to "any conceivable basis" that might be hypothesized.
In Barstow v. Shea,396 the plaintiff, a state employee, alleged that she
had been required to complete a medical incident report before leaving

388. See Farrell, supra note 361, at 41, n.233.

389. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
390. See Farrell, supra note 361, at 41.
391. Id. at 41, n.233.
392. Northwestern Univ. v. City of Evanston, 2002 WL 31027981, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11,
2002).

393.
394.
395.
396.

Id.
Id.
Id.
196 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Conn. 2002).
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work for illness while other employees had not been so required.397 A
federal district court for the District of Connecticut denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff
presented the depositions of two fellow employees who testified that they
had left work due to illness but had not been required to complete the
form.39 Therefore, "the jury could conclude that plaintiff was treated
differently from other similarly situated employees ' 399 and "the jury
could [also] discredit the reason given by the defendant for the
differential treatment,"400 and thus summary judgment was inappropriate.
In Oneto v. Town of Hamden,40 ' the plaintiff was a police officer who
had been passed over for promotion and then claimed a denial of equal
protection.4 2 The town moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the plaintiff had not introduced any evidence of similarly situated
persons who were treated differently. 4 3 The town argued that since
Oneto was promoted "only after resort to the courts, and well outside the
ordinary course of civil service procedure," there was no one else
similarly situated to him.40 4 But a federal district court for the District of
Connecticut did not identify the comparison class so narrowly. Instead,
the court identified three other persons who were promoted outside the
civil service rules (and were thus similarly situated) but had not been
subjected to a special investigation like Oneto (and were thus treated
differently). 4 5 Although the court conceded that Oneto's claim
ultimately would be difficult to establish, "there [was] sufficient
evidence in the record, when taken together and with all inferences
drawn in Oneto's favor, from which a jury could conclude that [the town
official's] actions were motivated by reasons unrelated to a legitimate
investigative objective. ' 40 6 Thus summary judgment for the defendant
was not appropriate.

397. Id. at 148.
398. Id.

399. Id. at 148.
400. Id. at 149.
401.

169 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D. Conn. 2001).

402. Id. at 73.
403. Id. at 81.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 82.
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FinalJudgments in Favor of Plaintiffs

Most successful "class of one" arguments have been won at the pretrial stage, that is, plaintiffs have successfully opposed defendants'
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. There are very
few reported cases of plaintiffs' ultimate victory on the merits of "class
of one" claims. This shortage of reported victories could mean that "class
of one" claims can now survive longer through the litigation, but
ultimately are not successful. An alternate, and perhaps more probable,
explanation is that both settlements of cases and final judgments,
particularly when they are the result of jury verdicts, do not lead to
reported opinions and thus are not readily retrievable through traditional
legal data bases. Thus the shortage of reported final judgments where
plaintiffs succeeded does not necessarily mean that they do not exist. In
any case, there are two reported post-Olech cases of final victory in
"class of one" claims.
The first of these cases, Cruz v. Town of Cicero, °7 was a "vindictive
action" claim that involved a particularly egregious case of ill will and
malice by a public official toward a private citizen. °8 Cruz was one more
in that long line of Seventh Circuit "class of one" cases. The court
affirmed a jury verdict of $402,000 for a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 40 9 The plaintiffs were in the business of converting
apartment buildings to condominiums. 4 '0 The town refused to grant
necessary certificates of compliance with the building and zoning
rules. 41 ' The jury's verdict was based in part on testimony that the town
President, Betty Loren-Maltese, had, through her friends in city
government, seen to it that the plaintiffs would not get the certificates
because they had been unwilling to make contributions to support her
political career.412 Thus, the certificates were denied in order to punish
the plaintiffs. 4 3 On appeal, Seventh Circuit held that the evidence
supported the verdict in that it demonstrated a "totally illegitimate
407. 275 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2001).

408. Id. at 589 ("[A] reasonable jury could have concluded (as this one did) that the trouble the
Gonzalez parties had obtaining certificates of compliance ... had nothing to do with [the merits].
Instead, these troubles stemmed from [the town president's] desire to punish Gonzalez for not
repaying her 'help' with significant financial contribution of some kind.").
409. Idat 582-83.

410.
411.
412.
413.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at

583.
583-85.
588-89.
589.
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and not rationally
animus," not related to the duties of government
414
related to a legitimate government interest.
Caudell v. City of Toccoa"5 was a rare example when a legislature,
rather than a local government official, singled out an individual for
invidious treatment and thereby created a "class of one" claim. As
indicated above, for the most part legislatures act by passing laws that
make use of broad generalizations.4 6 In these situations, the Equal
Protection Clause serves only as a limit on classification. 4 7 However, in
Caudell, the Georgia legislature approved an act directed at one person
only.418 The act provided that no one could serve on a city commission
while also serving as a member of the board of any hospital authority.419
The plaintiff was the only person in the entire state of Georgia affected
by the act. 420 A federal district court for the Northern District of Georgia
found that he had been "singled out for a special burden to which others
have not been subjected,'' 2 and that the state had "offered no legitimate
state purpose whatsoever to justify this legislative classification, 422 and
thus it violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court granted final
and enjoined city
judgment for plaintiff declaring the act unconstitutional
423
officials from taking any actions to enforce it.
V.

RE-EVALUATING THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OR CLASSBASED NATURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION AFTER OLECH

Although inadvertently and only implicitly, but nonetheless
definitively, the U.S. Supreme Court in Olech has resolved the problem
addressed in this article. That problem is that there are two views of the
equal protection clause that are conceptually in conflict but in practice
have ignored each other. With the benefit of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Olech, we can identify an appropriate resolution of the
conflict by reference to the following two rules.

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id. at 589.
153 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.B.
Caudell, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1378.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381.
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Rule 1.
When legislatures enact broad rules based on generalizations about
persons, the Equal Protection Clause operates as a limitation on
legislative classifications, but does no more. It does not protect
individual rights, and thus, the individual person who is treated unfairly
because a reasonable legislative generalization is not true as to him has
no equal protection claim. Administrative rulemaking is subject to these
same limits.
Rule 2.
When government officials make individual decisions to grant or
withhold a benefit to a particular person, or to impose or eliminate a
burden on a particular person, the Equal Protection Clause does protect
individual rights. The Supreme Court in Olech requires a plaintiff in
these situations to prove that "she has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational
basis for the difference in treatment."424 The plaintiff in such a case need
not identify a classification, but must simply show at least one other
person who was similarly situated but received different treatment. In the
courts of appeal, particularly the Seventh Circuit, there is an alternative
way to make out an individual rights claim under the Equal Protection
Clause. A plaintiff does so by proving that the a state official acted
vindictively with an intention to "get" the plaintiff.
With these two rules as guides, it is now possible to see what is wrong
with some of the earlier individual rights equal protection arguments.
The individual rights argument has been made most frequently to
demonstrate what is wrong with affirmative action. As that argument
goes, affirmative action is based on group rights rather than individual
rights and assumes that all persons of a particular race are effectively
fungible, that is, they all share the same views and thus will all contribute
in the same way to a "diverse" environment, or that they have all
suffered from the same wrongs of racial discrimination and thus are all
equally entitled to a race-based remedy. This, according to the critics,
ignores the fact that each person of any race is an individual and
therefore does not necessarily hold any particular view attributable to his
race, nor will any particular individual necessarily have suffered
discrimination based on his race. Further, race-based affirmative action
classifications necessarily assume that white persons all hold the same
viewpoints on race, and thus could not contribute to a diverse
424. Vill.
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
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environment, and also implicitly assume that all white persons somehow
are responsible for past racial discrimination and should thus be willing
to take a back seat today. It follows from this line of argument that racebased affirmative action is wrong because it confers benefits on all
members of a racial minority group even though the individual members
of that group do not individually deserve those benefits, and imposes
burdens on all members of the white majority, even though there are
many individual, innocent white persons who bear no responsibility for
the status of minorities in today's society.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of the affirmative action issue under
the Equal Protection Clause, it should not be resolved by resort to this
individual rights reasoning. Since virtually all the forms of affirmative
action have been subject to law suits have been broad rule-based
programs rather than individual decisions directed at one particular
person, they are thus subject only to the limit that the classifications they
create satisfy the relevant equal protection standard. When the
classification is based on race, the standard is strict scrutiny, so that the
racial classification must be necessary to achieve a compelling interest in
order to be upheld. But so long as the classification survives that test, the
fact that some individuals seem to be treated unfairly does not give rise
to a constitutional issue. The Court should be no more concerned for
Allan Bakke than it was for Robert Murgia. Any decision that overturns
an affirmative action program because it treats individuals as members of
a group rather than as individual persons is simply not in accord with
the.U.S. Supreme Court precedent. If the Supreme Court ultimately
determines that affirmative action programs violate the Constitution, that
determination should follow from the conclusion that a racial
classification has been used improperly, not because the classification
harmed an individual person.
However, the discussion of individual rights claims in affirmative
action cases does strike a proper chord in a much more limited context.
In determining what classifications should be given heightened scrutiny,
the Court has traditionally looked at a number of factors, including
whether or not the trait is immutable, whether or not the trait "frequently
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society, 425 and
whether the use of that trait is consistent with our commitment that "legal

425. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (citing Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. 426
Thus, in deciding what traits should receive heightened scrutiny on the
ground that their use by government is suspicious because usually
invidious, it might well be appropriate to consider the harm to individual
persons that result from unthinking generalizations about persons that
turn out, as they usually do, not to be universally true. But, once the
Court has identified those traits that will receive heightened scrutiny,
when it actually applies that scrutiny, the review should be only of the
classification, not of the individual person unfairly harmed.
Olech teaches us that the equal protection clause does protect
individual rights in a certain context, but the case clearly does not
support any wholesale changes in the way courts review legislative
classifications. Olech does support claims by individual persons who
have been treated unequally by an executive branch official. That limited
right itself will probably create substantial extra work for the federal
courts. But Olech does not create any such individual right against
legislative or administrative classification.

426. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.

